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Abstract
We propose that speech comprehension involves the activation of token representations of the pho-
nological forms of current lexical hypotheses, separately from the ongoing construction of a conceptual
interpretation of the current utterance. In a series of cross-modal priming experiments, facilitation of
lexical decision responses to visual target words (e.g., time) was found for targets that were semantic
associates of auditory prime words (e.g., date) when the primes were isolated words, but not when the
same primes appeared in sentence contexts. Identity priming (e.g., faster lexical decisions to visual date
after spoken date than after an unrelated prime) appeared, however, both with isolated primes and with
primes in prosodically neutral sentences. Associative priming in sentence contexts only emerged when
sentence prosody involved contrastive accents, or when sentences were terminated immediately after the
prime. Associative priming is therefore not an automatic consequence of speech processing. In no exper-
iment was there associative priming from embedded words (e.g., sedate-time), but there was inhibitory
identity priming (e.g., sedate-date) from embedded primes in sentence contexts. Speech comprehension
therefore appears to involve separate distinct activation both of token phonological word representa-
tions and of conceptual word representations. Furthermore, both of these types of representation are
distinct from the long-term memory representations of word form and meaning.
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1. Introduction
Understanding spoken language requires the conversion of sound to meaning. Words
are the units of meaning expressed in sound. The process of word recognition is thus the
heart of language understanding. The central concern of this paper is the involvement in
this process of separate lexical representations based on sound and based on meaning.
A separation between phonological representations (representations based on sound)
and conceptual representations (representations based on meaning) is assumed in many
psycholinguistic approaches to lexical processing; thus current models of language produc-
tion (e.g., Dell, Schwartz, Martin, SaVran, & Gagnon, 1997; Levelt, Roelofs, & Meyer,
1999) all distinguish between representations involving semantic and syntactic information
and representations involving phonological form. The literature on word recognition, in
contrast, has given rather little attention to distinguishing sub-components of lexical repre-
sentations involved in the recognition process, since such distinctions are not required to
explain the primary data on which the theories are built (time to accept a word as an exist-
ing form, or accuracy in doing so).
The present paper is concerned with this hitherto neglected issue. In a series of priming
experiments we vary aspects of the task in such a way that we can observe the separate
contribution of diVerent components of lexical representations in spoken-word recogni-
tion. We will show that phonological and conceptual representations participate separately
in the recognition process; we can further distinguish type from token representations; and
we will show that these distinctions are necessary to give a full and correct account of how
words are understood.
Most current recognition models, either in the visual or the spoken domain (e.g.,
McClelland & Elman, 1986; McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981; Morton, 1969; Norris, 1994;
see McQueen, 2005, for a recent review), are based upon a metaphor of lexical activation:
Perceptual input, visual or spoken, activates lexical representations, and the level of activa-
tion of any word is determined primarily by the degree of match between the perceptual
input and the word’s stored representation. In such theories, each lexical representation
that is activated is a unitary node (e.g., a local representation in a connectionist model) or a
simple feature counter (e.g., a logogen). Recognition occurs when the activation of a lexical
representation exceeds some threshold criterion. Although the models thus incorporate
lexical representations without further speciWcation, in fact it is easy to distinguish separate
levels of representation in the models’ actual operation. For example, in both TRACE
(McClelland & Elman, 1986) and Shortlist (Norris, 1994) there is a distinction between the
representation of a word in the mental lexicon itself, and the lexical candidates involved in
the recognition of any particular utterance. Whereas there is only one lexical entry for each
word in the listener’s mental lexicon, there will be multiple representations of the lexical
candidates corresponding to each word. It is necessary that more than one token of each
lexical candidate be possible, otherwise utterances containing more than one token of a
given word could not be processed. Consider, for example, the three tokens of /si:t/
involved in recognizing the sentence “Everyone’s receipt for tomorrow’s concert seat will
be on their seat at dinner”; one token is spuriously present as part of a longer word, while
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with conceptual representations which are, arguably, quite distinct.
The concurrent activation of multiple lexical candidates allowed for in models of this
type is resolved by competition; activated candidates compete with one another, the out-
come being an optimal interpretation of the likely sequence of words in the input. The
competition process is performed by an interactive activation network, with overlapping
word candidates connected by inhibitory links. In the above example sentence, we assume
therefore that separate phonological representations of seat will compete with (in one case)
a representation of receipt and (in another case) with alternative fully or partially sup-
ported candidates such as see, cedar or perceive. A single lexical entry for seat could thus
nevertheless support multiple instances of the phonological form /si:t/ representing
multiple tokens in the competition.
Competition with inhibition has proven remarkably eVective in accounting for the recog-
nition of words in running speech. Because of the lack of clear and reliable cues to the loca-
tion of word boundaries in continuous speech, some mechanism is required that can
determine which sequence of words best matches the input. The competition process achieves
this in models of the TRACE/Shortlist type. Norris (1994) illustrated how it does so by con-
sidering the spoken input ship inquiry. After the Wrst two syllables of this input, shipping is
likely to be a better match to the input than ship. However, by the end of the utterance,
inquiry will have inhibited shipping, and this will prevent ship being inhibited by shipping. The
competition between overlapping words enables these models to arrive at the correct lexical
parse of the input (i.e., here ship inquiry). Importantly, even if shipping remains a better match
to part of the input than ship, inhibition of the latter part of shipping by inquiry ensures that
ship becomes part of the preferred interpretation of the utterance.
Competition also allows for the rejection of words which are only spuriously present in the
input; note that normal speech contains a very large number of such words (McQueen, Cutler,
Briscoe, & Norris, 1995). Spuriously present words can be embedded within other words (e.g.,
seat in receipt) or they can occur across word boundaries (e.g., below in terrible omen). In com-
petition models, these embedded words all enter into the competition process that determines
the correct interpretation of the utterance. The competing representations of spuriously pres-
ent words will ultimately lose the competition, and little evidence of their presence will in the
end be discernible if the process has run its course in the intended way. However, their partici-
pation in the competition is an essential component of this view of spoken-word recognition.
As we shall see in the next section, the activation metaphor incorporated in the current
models has been extremely fruitful in stimulating spoken-word recognition research. There
is abundant evidence in support of multiple concurrent activation, including evidence con-
cerning spuriously present words, and there is evidence supporting a role for inhibition as
instantiated in competition models.
1.1. Testing activation
Since its introduction by Swinney (1979; see also, Swinney, Onifer, Prather and
Hirshkowitz, 1979) the cross-modal priming task has proven the task of choice for examin-
ing the activation of lexical representations. In cross-modal priming experiments, partici-
pants typically hear a prime (a word or a sentence) and then see a target word. An inXuence
of the relationship between prime and target on responses to the target (e.g., speed or accu-
racy of lexical decisions) is taken as an indication of lexical activation, Wrst for the prime,
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ers heard polysemous prime words such as bug in sentences and made lexical decisions to
visually presented target words that were associates of each of the meanings of the primes
(e.g., spy and ant for bug). Responses to both targets were facilitated (in comparison to a
control target), which Swinney interpreted as indicating that both meanings of the polyse-
mous prime had been activated.
In the Wrst years of research with the task, all cross-modal priming studies involved
associative relationships between prime and target. Clearly, activation of a semantic associ-
ate implies that the conceptual representation corresponding to the input word has been
activated. Since the late 1980s, however, cross-modal priming has existed in two variants:
besides cross-modal associative priming we have cross-modal identity priming, in which
the target is a visually presented token of the prime word. Identity priming does not neces-
sarily imply that conceptual representations have been activated, though of course facilita-
tion in an identity priming study does imply that a phonological representation has been
activated by the input.
The two variants of cross-modal priming make it tempting to imagine that each variant
could be used to examine activation of a diVerent kind of representation. Unfortunately,
the pattern of possible priming relationships (or absence thereof) is rather more compli-
cated than such a simple picture would require; we see three problems which stand in the
way. First, it may be the case that separate phonological and conceptual representations
are involved in spoken-word recognition, but they are tightly coupled such that activation
of one necessarily implies activation of the other. In that case, there would be little distinc-
tion between results with the two types of cross-modal priming. Second, the relationship
between activation and priming is not symmetric; while priming may well imply activation,
the reverse is not the case. There is no guarantee that a representation that is accessed or
activated during the course of word recognition will lead to detectable priming. This means
that priming does not provide a magic window onto the inner workings of word recogni-
tion, and that diVerent types of priming cannot be translated as implying activation of
diVerent types of representations. Third, it is often unclear whether activation of a prime
will cause recognition of a related target to be facilitated, or, due to the pattern of activa-
tion of competitor words, to be inhibited. Again, this means that predicting patterns of
results with priming tasks is far from simple.
The priming literature does not provide an agreed basis for such prediction. Semantic
priming, for example, has variously been proposed to be due to spreading activation
(Collins & Loftus, 1975; McNamara, 1992), compound cueing (RatcliV & McKoon, 1988),
plausibility checking (Norris, 1986), feature overlap (Huber, ShiVrin, Lyle, & Ruys, 2001),
or a hybrid of multiple mechanisms (Neely & Keefe, 1989; Neely, 1991). Most of these the-
ories have been developed in the context of single word priming studies; they assume that a
single prime word is activated and that priming follows from the activation of that single
word. Similarly, accounts of sentence context eVects (Kintsch, 1988) assume that the lis-
tener or reader establishes a single representation of the context, and that it is this single
representation that leads to priming. However, in spoken-word recognition, evidence
forces us to accept that multiple candidate words are simultaneously activated (see
McQueen, 2005, for review). Theories of priming do not make it clear, a priori, whether all
of these candidates should produce priming, or whether only the most highly activated
candidates should do so. Thus, the literature does not allow us to resolve the Wrst problem-
atic issue, whether separate representations may be separately activated.
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itself. For example, in the location-shifting theory of Meyer and Schvaneveldt (1971), or
Forster’s (1976) search model, semantic or associative priming is a consequence of the
structure of the lexicon. This structure reXects semantic relationships between words, and
semantic priming thus follows from lexical access rather than from the activation of spe-
ciWc semantic representations. A similar argument applies to spreading activation models.
Accessing a lexical entry might produce associative priming by the spread of activation to
other entries, even in the absence of any semantic representations being constructed during
the recognition process. The implicit theory underlying the use of priming as a tool indeed
appears to be that lexical activation will automatically produce associative priming by
means of a mechanism such as spreading activation.
In the case of both spoken and visual word recognition, however, lexical access alone
may not be suYcient to produce semantic priming. As we shall see below, Williams (1988)
and Tabossi (1988a) both failed to Wnd cross-modal associative priming from words in
spoken sentences when the targets were not related to the overall meaning of the sentence.
Likewise, in the reading literature, Friedrich, Henik, and Tzelgov (1991) have shown that
when subjects are required to perform a letter search task on a prime word, this eliminates
semantic priming but not identity priming. Results such as these cast doubt on simple
accounts of priming based on spreading activation. That is, lexical access need not lead
automatically to semantic activation. The second problem, concerning the logical relation
of priming to activation, thus seems to be one which indeed bedevils priming research.
The third problem, of potential inhibitory as well as facilitatory priming eVects, also
needs to be considered. Inhibitory processes can mask lexical activation: Even when there
is clear evidence that a representation of a word has been activated, there may be no
observable priming if inhibitory processes immediately suppress the initial activation. Thus
as Marí-BeVa, Houghton, Estévez, and Fuentes (2000) have pointed out, absence of prim-
ing cannot be taken as evidence of absence of activation. When subjects are required
actively to ignore either a word or an individual object, related targets can actually be
inhibited (e.g., Dalrymple-Alford & Bundayr, 1966; see Marí-BeVa et al., 2000, for review).
Tipper (1985) described this process as “negative priming.” Marí-BeVa et al. manipulated
the task subjects had to perform on the prime. When the task was detection of letters in the
prime word, priming of visual lexical decisions to target words was small and facilitatory.
But when the prime task was detection of letters in a separate letter string, and the prime
word had to be ignored, priming was inhibitory. This kind of negative priming clearly indi-
cates that the word was semantically activated even when it had to be ignored. Thus it is
important to take account of both possible positive and negative eVects in priming studies.
With these provisos in mind, it is perhaps not so surprising that the cross-modal priming
literature presents, as the following review shows, a complex pattern.
1.2. Cross-modal associative priming
The Wrst decade and a half of associate priming research is summarised by Tabossi
(1996). Primes in isolation produced robust facilitation (e.g., Andruski, Blumstein, &
Burton, 1994; Bölte & Coenen, 2002; Marslen-Wilson & Zwitserlood, 1989; Swinney,
Onifer, Prather, & Hirshkowitz, 1979; Williams, 1988). Primes in sentences on the other
hand have not always been so reliable. Swinney et al. (1979) and Lucas (1987) and
Shillcock (1982, 1990) were among those who reported signiWcant associative priming
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texts were reported by Williams (1988) and Tabossi (1988a). Williams found that primes
which produced reliable associative facilitation in isolation (chair-table) and in random
word lists (table after chair in “when brass heard could in that only land as more Wlm to
interested to is chair because which came could all ice in”) did not produce any facilitation
in perfectly sensible sentences which were not relevant to the particular associative rela-
tionship involved in the prime–target pair (table after chair in “The man found that he
could only reach the best apples by standing on a chair because they were all so high up”).
There was, however, signiWcant facilitation in “The man entered the dining room and sat
down on a chair in eager anticipation of a hearty meal.” Williams argued that associative
relationships are not automatically called up by lexical access of the prime words, but are
only available in what Foss and Ross (1983) termed the “eVective context” for priming,
that is, the propositional representation of the sentence as a whole. If the associative rela-
tion in question (e.g., chair as something on which one sits at a table to eat dinner) is rele-
vant to the propositional representation (e.g., a man is about to eat dinner), there will be
priming of that association. If it is not relevant to the proposition (e.g., a man has to stand
on a chair to reach something), there will be no priming. However, when the words appear
in a list, the only eVective context is provided by the words themselves, and this will lead to
priming.
Similarly, Tabossi (1988a) found no priming when the sentences were biased toward
an aspect of the meaning of the (sentence-Wnal) prime that was not related to the target
(e.g., responses to fat were not primed after the sentence “To soften it, the woman
heated a piece of butter”), but signiWcant facilitation when the sentences were biased
toward semantics shared by the prime and the target (e.g., responses to fat were faster
relative to control conditions after “To follow her diet, the woman eliminated the use of
butter”). Tabossi argued that the activation of lexical semantics is context-sensitive;
that is, semantic activation depends on the current interpretation of the utterance. This
interpretation is clearly similar to the eVective context proposal. Williams’ and
Tabossi’s results are also consistent with data reported by Hess, Foss, and Carroll
(1995) from nine experiments involving a slightly diVerent task. Participants heard short
prose passages and had to name the Wnal word, which was presented visually. Hess
et al., too, found no contextual facilitation from local lexical information; facilitation
was only found if the target word was related to the global discourse context. These
results made it clear that one important factor in determining whether priming will be
observed is the extent to which the prime words are related to the overall meaning of the
sentence or discourse.
Another factor aVecting the likelihood of observing associative priming is where the
prime appears relative to the end of the sentence. Several experiments have reported priming
when the sentences are terminated immediately after the oVset of the prime—either whole
word primes (Moss & Marslen-Wilson, 1993) or word-fragment primes (i.e., only the initial
portions of longer words; Tabossi, Collina, Mazzetti, & Zoppello, 2000; Zwitserlood, 1989;
Zwitserlood & Schriefers, 1995). Gow and Gordon (1995) terminated their speech materials
(with embedded-word primes) when participants responded to the targets, that is, at variable
times soon after prime oVset. Truncation of a sentence of which a representation is being
constructed may encourage listeners to attend to the primes, disrupting the construction of
sentence-level representations. This would lead to stronger activation of the meaning repre-
sentations of the primes, and hence activation of associated words, and a priming eVect.
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end of sentences may draw listeners’ attention to the prime words, especially if most of the
primes in an experiment appear at the end of sentences. Many of the studies that have
reported associative priming in sentences have indeed used sentence-Wnal primes (Janse,
2003; McKoon, Allbritton, & RatcliV, 1996; Seidenberg, Tanenhaus, Leiman, & Bienkow-
ski, 1982; Simpson, 1981; Tabossi et al., 2000). Note, though, that Tabossi (1988a), as
described above, found no priming from sentence-Wnal words when the target was unre-
lated to the overall meaning of the sentence, and in one of Williams’s (1988) experiments,
sentence-Wnal primes similarly failed to produce associative priming.
In some studies in which priming has been observed, the primes appear mainly at the
end of clauses or at points indicated with a comma in the transcription of published mate-
rials (Colombo & Williams, 1990; Onifer & Swinney, 1981; Tabossi, 1988b; Tabossi,
Colombo, & Job, 1987; Tabossi & Zardon, 1993). In Cutler (1986) and Lucas (1987), the
primes appeared neither at the end of their context sentences nor systematically before
major clause boundaries. They appeared, however, relatively late in long sentence contexts
which were heavily biased towards one or other meaning of the (ambiguous) primes. Simi-
larly, in yet other experiments, discourse context was provided in the form of a context sen-
tence which preceded the sentence containing the prime (Blutner & Sommer, 1988;
Swinney, 1979, Experiment 1). The presence of a discourse context may encourage listeners
to process sentences in greater depth and incorporate more of the meaning of the prime
into the interpretation of the sentence. (Note, however, that discourse sentences are not
necessary for associative priming to emerge. In most studies, no such contexts are pro-
vided. Furthermore, Swinney (1979, Experiment 2) also found priming without preceding
context sentences.)
Thus, the variability in associative priming may depend on a number of factors, all of
which act to modulate the kind of interpretations which listeners build of the test utter-
ances. Priming is more likely to be observed if primes are placed in a prominent location
(e.g., at the ends of sentences or clauses, or at the end of artiWcially truncated auditory
material), or if the prime–target associative relationship is relevant to the meaning of the
sentence. Nonetheless, none of these factors guarantees the appearance of signiWcant prim-
ing eVects, and there are also studies which have detected associative priming from non-
embedded words in sentence contexts for which none of the above criteria appears to apply
(Shillcock, 1990; Swinney, 1979; Tabossi, Burani, & Scott, 1995).
1.3. Cross-modal identity priming
There is a much smaller body of work so far using the identity-priming version of the
task, but it is clear that when the prime and the target are the same word the pattern of
results is much more straightforward than when prime and target have an associative rela-
tionship. Both when spoken primes are presented in isolation and when they appear in sen-
tence contexts, there is robust facilitation when visual targets are identical to those primes.
Given the reliability of this facilitation, cross-modal identity priming has been used to
examine whether, in a number of situations in which the phonological form of the prime
diVers from the canonical form of that word, there is still a priming eVect. These situations
include the case of phonological alterations due to continuous speech processes such as
place assimilation and liaison, and the case of phonetic alterations reXecting variability in
the Wne-grained realization of spoken words. We will not review these sets of results in
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control conditions of these studies (i.e., when the prime has its canonical pronunciation)
has been replicated across studies, both for primes in isolation (van Alphen & McQueen,
2006; Bölte & Coenen, 2002; Coenen, Zwitserlood, & Bölte, 2001; Marslen-Wilson, Nix, &
Gaskell, 1995) and for primes in sentence contexts (Coenen et al., 2001; Gaskell & Mar-
slen-Wilson, 1996, 2001; Gaskell, Spinelli, & Meunier, 2002; Gow, 2002; Spinelli,
McQueen, & Cutler, 2003). Vroomen and de Gelder (1995) observed facilitatory identity
priming from prime words embedded in nonsense contexts.
As with cross-modal associative priming, identity priming has also been examined
where the prime consists only of a word fragment. This variant of the paradigm has also
been used to examine a number of issues in spoken-word recognition including place
assimilation and the uptake of lexical stress information. Control conditions across a num-
ber of studies show once again that there is robust facilitation when the prime fragment is a
perfect match to the target, both for fragments in isolation (Gaskell & Marslen-Wilson,
2002; Marslen-Wilson et al., 1995; Cutler & van Donselaar, 2001) and in sentence contexts
(Cooper, Cutler, & Wales, 2002; Davis, Marslen-Wilson, & Gaskell, 2002; van Donselaar,
Koster, & Cutler, 2005; Soto-Faraco, Sebastián-Gallés, & Cutler, 2001).
1.4. Embedded words
Of particular interest for the present study is the fact that cross-modal priming has been
the task of choice for investigation of the activation in spoken-word recognition of words
embedded in other words, such as seat in receipt. Studies of embedded words have mainly
used associative priming. Shillcock (1990) found that words such as trombone, presented in
sentence contexts, produced priming of responses to the visual word rib, an associate of the
embedded word bone. Gow and Gordon (1995) contrasted priming from sentences con-
taining words such as tulips or two lips. They found that two lips primed words related to
tulips and to lips, but that there was no priming from tulips to words related to lips.
Vroomen and de Gelder (1997) studied the activation of embedded words with isolated
Dutch words (rather than sentences) as associative primes; they observed priming from
word-Wnal embeddings where the embedded word corresponded to a complete syllable in
the embedding word (e.g., boos, ’angry,’ in framboos, ’raspberry’), but not when the onset of
the embedded word did not coincide with the onset of a syllable (e.g., wijn, ’wine,’ in zwijn,
’swine’). Isel and Bacri (1999), using French isolated word primes, found priming for words
that formed the Wnal syllable of a longer word, but no priming from onset-embedded
words. Luce and CluV (1998) presented prime words such as hemlock, and found that the
oVset embeddings (e.g., lock) produced associative priming to words associated not with
the carrier words but with the embeddings (e.g., key).
Tabossi et al. (1995) observed evidence of activation of Italian words such as visite ’visit’
in phrases such as visi tediati ’bored faces’ within sentences. Here visite begins in the same
way as visi, but also continues into the beginning of tediati—that is, the embedding is
across words. Responses to associates of such embeddings were facilitated.
Identity priming was used by Marslen-Wilson, Tyler, Waksler, and Older (1994) and by
Shatzman (2006) to examine activation of embedded words. Marslen-Wilson et al., used
spoken primes in isolation, and in line with the results of Isel and Bacri (1999), they found
no evidence of activation of word-initial embedded words (e.g., bulletin-bullet). Interest-
ingly, they found an inhibitory priming eVect (of 12 ms, on average; non-signiWcant) for
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Shatzman (2006) for Dutch oVset embeddings such as bel ‘bell’ in libel ’dragonXy,’ and in
this case the eVect reached signiWcance.
These results present a picture of embedded-word activation which is not fully consis-
tent. However, we suggest that activation may depend on a combination of eVects. First,
there are segmentation cues, which are obviously relevant for word boundary detection
and hence for deciding what particular string constitutes a separate word. Gow and Gor-
don (1995) suggested on the basis of their pattern of results that there was cross-modal
associative priming in their materials only when the onset of the word was acoustically
marked. Note that segmentation cues were also present in the Shillcock (1990) materials:
The carrier words all had weak-strong stress patterns (i.e., the Wrst syllables were either
weak, as in descend, or had secondary stress, as in trombone). In English, the onsets of
strong syllables provide an important cue for lexical segmentation (Cutler & Norris, 1988;
Norris, McQueen, Cutler, & ButterWeld, 1997), so bone in trombone began at a segmenta-
tion point. Syllabic alignment was present in the cases where Isel and Bacri (1999) observed
facilitation for oVset-embedded words, which is likewise consistent with claims that the syl-
lable cues lexical segmentation in French (see Cutler, McQueen, Norris, & Somejuan, 2001,
for review). Syllabic alignment was also the prerequisite for the eVect observed in Dutch by
Vroomen and de Gelder (1997). Thus activation of oVset-embedded words may depend
primarily on the presence of segmentation cues.
Second, there are also eVects of the lexical competition process. Although cross-word
embeddings such as visite in visi tediati appear to be activated (Tabossi et al., 1995), and
although this suggests that word-internal onset embeddings (car in cargo) are also likely to
be brieXy activated, there is no sign of activation of such onset-embedded words by the end
of the longer competitor (Isel & Bacri, 1999; Marslen-Wilson et al., 1994). This is presum-
ably due to eVects of competition. Note that although Tabossi et al. used sentence materi-
als rather than isolated words, and they studied a diVerent kind of embedding from the
word-internal embeddings studied by Isel and Bacri, there is another critical diVerence
between these two studies, to wit, the presentation point of the target words. Isel and Bacri
presented their targets at the oVset of the longer carrier word (e.g., cargo), by which time
the embedded word (car) could have already been activated and then suppressed through
competition with the carrier. Tabossi et al., however, presented their target words at the
oVset of the cross-word-boundary embeddings (e.g., at the oVset of visite). At this point,
there is more bottom-up support for the embedding than for the intended word (visi).
Tabossi et al. may thus have been more likely to detect activation of the unintended word
before it was inhibited by its competitors. We suggest, therefore, that activation of onset-
embedded words depends primarily on competition.
1.5. Summary
The picture revealed by our review obviously motivates further research. In particular,
the possibility that cross-modal identity priming and cross-modal associative priming are
tapping into diVerent types of representation has not previously been subject to direct
investigation. The present experiments therefore sought to establish what kind of represen-
tations of lexical phonological form and of lexical meaning are involved in speech compre-
hension, and to examine the relationship between word-form and word-meaning
representations. The simplest model that we consider is one in which the phonological and
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same lexical entry in long-term memory. As we have argued, such a model predicts that
identity- and associative-priming eVects should go hand in hand. We will compare this
model with one in which a distinction is made between stored lexical representations (both
phonological and conceptual knowledge) and the token-based representations of words
which are used during the on-line processing of any particular utterance. This latter model
predicts that identity- and associative-priming eVects can (but need not) dissociate, per-
haps, for example, as a function of whether words are embedded or not.
Our Wrst experiments attempted to replicate Shillcock (1990), Wrst in isolated words
(Experiment 1A), and then in sentences (Experiment 1B). We thus used cross-modal asso-
ciative priming to examine the activation of conceptual representations of embedded
words (e.g., date in sedate) and of the same words when the speaker actually intended them
(e.g., date). We predicted on the basis of the previous research on embedded words that we
would observe activation of the semantics of a word such as date whether it was what the
speaker intended or it was an embedded word. We also manipulated the ISI between the
oVset of the critical auditory word and the onset of the visual target word, to determine
whether the pattern of priming changed over time.
The Shillcock (1990) results are particularly important with respect to the question of
whether there are distinct type- and token-based lexical representations. For the oVset
embedding bone/trombone, for instance, both TRACE and Shortlist predict that the lexical
node corresponding to bone should be strongly inhibited by concurrent activation of trom-
bone. Simulations from Shortlist are presented in Fig. 1. Activation of the embedded word
is almost completely suppressed by the activation of the longer word. TRACE has a similar
lexical competition process to that in Shortlist, and thus makes similar predictions about
the activation of embedded words (cf. McClelland & Elman, 1986, Figure 27). Thus Shill-
cock’s (1990) results would seem to contradict one of the central predictions of Shortlist
and TRACE. In contrast, both Shortlist and TRACE predict the pattern found with car-
rier words such as Luce and CluV’s (1998) hemlock. Here, both embedded words hem and
Fig. 1. Shortlist simulations. The activation of the lexical candidates trombone and bone is plotted over time, as
the successive phonemes of the input trombone were presented to the model. Note that “[” represents a segment of
silence. For comparison, the activation of the candidate bone, given the input bone, is also plotted, aligned with
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frequency than the longer carriers. In this case activation of the Wnal embedded word is
unlikely to be completely suppressed by the carrier word, so that activation of the oVset
embedding is stronger than when there is no onset embedding as well.
The inhibition for oVset-embedded words observed with identity priming by Marslen-
Wilson et al. (1994) and Shatzman (2006) further seems to conXict with the facilitatory
eVects found with associative priming (e.g., Shillcock, 1990). However, this diVerence may
arise because the two types of task are tapping into diVerent types of lexical representation.
Indeed, the conclusions that can be drawn from all these priming studies depend critically
on establishing which representations drive associative and identity priming. If, for exam-
ple, access to stored phonological knowledge about a word is itself suYcient to produce
associative priming, then the results may be fully consistent with a model like Shortlist,
which, as described earlier, has a separate stage of lexical access. Mere entry of an item into
the competition process may be suYcient to lead in due course to associative priming,
while the inhibition measured in identity priming may reXect the competition between
token-based representations shown in Fig. 1. To examine this possibility, we directly com-
pared cross-modal associative priming with cross-modal identity priming. Experiment 2
used identity priming with the materials from Experiment 1.
We also tested whether associative priming could be modulated by the overall context in
which the prime appears. As mentioned earlier, there is evidence that associative priming
can be found for words in isolation, but not when the same words appear in sentences. This
suggests that priming may be driven by the listeners’ overall interpretations of sentences,
rather than by the activation of individual word-meaning representations. Such a dissocia-
tion would be inconsistent with the notion that associative priming is an automatic conse-
quence of lexical access. We therefore contrasted isolated primes (Experiment 1A), with
primes in sentences (Experiment 1B).
In Experiments 3 and 4 we attempted to manipulate the way associative primes were
processed in sentence contexts by altering, in turn, aspects of the experimental design
(Experiment 3), the semantic complexity of the prime-bearing sentences (Experiment 4B),
or the prosodic contours of the sentences (Experiment 4C).
2. Experiment 1: Associative priming
2.1. Experiment 1A: Prime words in isolation
2.1.1. Method
2.1.1.1. Materials. The stimuli were based on those used by Shillcock (1990). The critical
items were the set of 32 bisyllabic words shown in Appendix A. These words were selected
such that the Wnal syllable of each of them was homophonous with a real word (e.g., date in
sedate). The embedded words did not need to be orthographically identical to the Wnal syl-
lable of the carrier bisyllabic word (e.g., stream in extreme). They could also be homo-
phones (e.g., either night or knight in ignite). A critical requirement was that the carrier
word and the embedded word should be semantically unrelated. Carrier words in which
the Wrst syllable’s pronunciation corresponded to that of an independent word were
excluded. Thirty of the 32 carriers had a weak-strong prosodic pattern (i.e., either the Wrst
syllable had the reduced vowel schwa, as in the majority of cases, e.g., sedate, or the Wrst
syllable had a full vowel, but primary stress was on the second syllable, e.g., trombone).
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with bound stems (e.g., report, protest, and decrease). In these cases, however, the stems
were semantically unrelated to the embedded word. According to Marslen-Wilson et al.
(1994), there should therefore be no morphological priming from the carrier word to the
embedded word. One of the carriers was a tensed verb (begun).
Semantic associates of the embedded words were generated by presenting listeners with
a recording of a set of 56 possible experimental items. Listeners (who did not take part in
the main experiment) were instructed to write down, immediately after hearing the word,
the Wrst word it brought to mind. Only those words for which 25% or more of the listeners
provided the same associate as response were included in the experiment proper. The mean
association strength of the selected items was 44.7%.
The experimental materials therefore consisted of 32 pairs of carrier bisyllabic words
and their embedded monosyllabic words, which served as auditory primes, and a further 32
words, each of which was associated to an embedded word, which served as visual targets.
There were, in addition, 48 Wller prime–target pairs. The Wllers consisted of 16 monosyl-
labic primes and 24 bisyllabic primes which were followed by non-word targets, and eight
bisyllabic primes which were followed by word targets that were related to the primes (e.g.,
concern-worry). These eight prime–target pairs were included to ensure that participants
could not assume that targets, if related, would always be related either to the monosyl-
labic words embedded in the carriers or to the isolated versions of those monosyllabic
words. Sixteen of the bisyllabic primes with non-word targets had embedded words in their
second syllable (e.g., defense-drow, with fence as the embedded word). The presence of these
items meant that primes with embeddings were not predictive of word targets. All of the
non-word targets were orthotactically legal English pseudowords. Finally, there were ten
practice prime–target pairs; at least one example of each of the prime–target pairings (i.e.,
with respect to the lexical status of the targets, and the relatedness of the word targets to
the prime or the embedded word in the prime) was included in the practice set.
2.1.1.2. Design. There were four priming conditions, created by crossing the length of the
auditory prime (non-embedded vs. embedded) with the associative relationship between the
prime and the visual target (related vs. unrelated). Each of the target words served in all four
conditions (e.g., non-embedded, related: date-time; embedded, related: sedate-time; non-
embedded, unrelated: come-time; and embedded, unrelated: succumb-time). To produce these
conditions in a fully within-item design, the 32 target words were split into 16 semantically
unassociated pairs (e.g., time was paired with go) matched in frequency, using frequency
counts for written British English (HoXand & Johansson, 1982). The combinations of each of
the primes with each of the targets in these 16 pairs generated the four conditions (e.g., the
prime–target pairs for go were thus: non-embedded, related: come-go; embedded, related:
succumb-go; non-embedded, unrelated: date-go; and embedded, unrelated: sedate-go).
Four lists of materials were constructed by counterbalancing the prime–target pairings
for each of the experimental target words across the lists, such that each list contained all
32 experimental targets, eight in each of the four priming conditions. All 48 Wller targets
(eight words and 40 non-words) and their primes appeared in each list. The visual targets
were thus balanced on the lexical decision task for “yes” and “no” responses. Within the
word targets in any one list, 24 were related (eight of the date-time type, eight of the sedate-
time type, and eight of the concern-worry type) and 16 were unrelated. In addition, there
were two pseudo-random presentation orders for each list, constructed so that there was
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all the analyses presented here, data were collapsed over stimulus randomizations or pre-
sentation orders. Each participant was presented with one version of one of the lists.
ISI was a between-participants factor. For half of the participants, the visual targets
were presented without delay at the oVset of the auditory prime (0 ms ISI). For the other
participants, there was a 500 ms delay from prime oVset to target onset (500 ms ISI).
2.1.1.3. Procedure. All of the auditory (prime) materials were spoken by a phonetically
trained speaker (a male native speaker of British English) who was unaware of the purpose
of the experiment. The two words with primary stress on the Wrst syllable (frantic and hic-
cup) were produced with unreduced second syllables, to ensure proper match of that sec-
ond syllable to the embedded words (tick and cup). Recordings were made on one channel
of a Digital Audio Tape, using a high quality microphone in a sound-proofed room. The
stimuli were then transferred to a computer where a speech editor was used to label each
word, and to place a timing signal on the unused channel coincident with the oVset of each
word. The timing signal was inaudible to participants. The speech materials were then writ-
ten to an audio CD.
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room. They were told that they would
hear spoken words, followed by visual stimuli on a computer screen. They were told that
some of the visual stimuli would be real words of English, and some would not. They were
asked to decide whether these items were words or not, and to respond as quickly and as
accurately as possible by pressing either the “yes” or the “no” button on a response pad.
Participants were also required to repeat the auditory word immediately after making the
lexical decision response. The auditory words were presented over high quality headphones
(Sony MDR CD550) driven by a portable CD player. Visual targets were presented on a
CRT computer monitor in lower case characters where the height of the tallest character
subtended a visual angle of approximately 0.7°. Stimulus presentation and timing were
controlled by a laptop computer. Before the main part of the experiment participants
received the block of 10 practice trials twice.
2.1.1.4. Participants. The listeners in all of the experiments reported here were native
speakers of British English, had no known hearing problems, and had normal or corrected
vision. Participants in all experiments were paid a small honorarium. In the 0 ms ISI condi-
tion of this experiment participants were 36 members of the MRC Cognition and Brain
Sciences Unit volunteer panel. The data from four participants were discarded because
they failed to follow instructions. Participants in the 500 ms ISI condition were 32 students
at St. John’s College, Cambridge.
2.1.2. Results
The 64 participants whose data were included in the analysis performed the secondary
(repetition) task with high accuracy (no participant made more than two repetition errors
on the 32 experimental trials, and 41 participants made no such errors). Mean lexical deci-
sion reaction times and error rates are shown in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. In this and all
subsequent experiments, responses slower than 1800 ms were considered as errors. In the
latency analysis, there was a signiWcant main eVect of relatedness: responses to related tar-
gets were, on average, 24 ms faster than responses to unrelated targets (F1 (1,56) D 19.49,
p < .0001; F2 (1,31) D 5.65, p < .05). There was also a signiWcant main eVect of embedding:
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embedded primes (F1 (1,56) D 24.39, p < .0001; F2 (1,31) D 9.38, p < .005). There was, how-
ever, a signiWcant interaction between relatedness and embedding (F1 (1,56) D 8.68,
p < .005; F2 (1,31) D 5.67, p < .05), reXecting the fact that the relatedness eVect was much
larger for the non-embedded words (mean diVerence: 39 ms) than for the words embedded
in the bisyllabic carriers (mean diVerence: 8 ms). Sub-analyses showed that the relatedness
eVect was highly signiWcant for the non-embedded words (F1 (1,56) D 32.51, p < .0001;
F2 (1,31) D 19.24, p < .0001), but not for the embedded words (F1 (1,56) D 1.00, p > .1;
F2 < 1).
Table 1
Associative priming results, Experiments 1, 3, and 4: Reaction times






Non-embedded Prime Embedded prime
Prime–target relationship Prime–target Relationship
Related Unrelated Related Unrelated
date-time come-time sedate-time succumb-time
1A Isolated words 0 573 619 633 636
500 552 584 576 588
Combined 563 602 604 612
1B Sentences 0 543 548 547 551
500 552 563 552 561
Combined 547 556 550 556
3A Sentences 0 626 613 624 631
3B Sentences 0 587 597 — —
3C Sentences 0 580 602 — —
4A Sentences 0 622 618 623 622
4B Sentences 0 579 586 588 580
Table 2
Associative priming results, Experiments 1, 3, and 4: Error rates





Non-embedded prime Embedded prime
Prime–target relationship Prime–target relationship
Related Unrelated Related Unrelated
date-time come-time sedate-time succumb-time
1A Isolated words 0 1.2 3.9 3.1 3.1
500 1.2 2.3 3.5 2.3
Combined 1.2 3.1 3.3 2.7
1B Sentences 0 1.6 1.6 1.6 2.3
500 2.3 1.2 2.3 1.2
Combined 2.0 1.4 2.0 1.8
3A Sentences 0 0.8 2.3 1.2 2.0
3B Sentences 0 0.8 2.5 — —
3C Sentences 0 1.4 3.9 — —
4A Sentences 0 0.8 2.0 1.2 1.2
4B Sentences 0 1.6 2.0 1.6 1.6
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was an ISI of 0 ms. This eVect of ISI was signiWcant by items (F2 (1,31) D 56.53, p < .0001)
but not by subjects (F1 (1,56) D 2.06, p > .1). Note that the discrepancy between the two
analyses is a consequence of the fact that ISI is a between-subjects factor which appears as
a within-items factor in the items analysis. Non-signiWcant diVerences between subject
groups can therefore produce signiWcant eVects in the items analysis. The only other signiW-
cant eVects were two three-way interactions involving the factor representing groups of
subjects who received the four diVerent lists. There were interactions between groups, ISI
and relatedness (F1 (3,56) D 3.65, p < .02), and between groups, embedding and relatedness
(F1 (3,56) D 3.60, p < .02). In the error analysis the eVect of relatedness was not signiWcant
(Fs < 1). The only signiWcant eVect in the errors was an interaction between groups and ISI
(F1 (3,56) D 3.42, p < .05).
2.1.3. Discussion
A robust priming eVect was found for targets preceded by monosyllabic words with
which they were associatively related (e.g., date-time), but there was no evidence of priming
from the same words to the same targets when the monosyllabic words were embedded as
the second syllable of bisyllabic primes (e.g., sedate-time). This result contrasts with those
from the studies by Isel and Bacri (1999) and Vroomen and de Gelder (1997), both of
which tested priming with isolated words, and with those from the Shillcock (1990) study,
which used words in sentences as primes. The results of Experiment 1A alone do not allow
us to determine whether our failure to observe embedded word priming is due to our use of
isolated word primes (cf. the contrast with the Shillcock study, which used very similar
English materials), or our use of English materials (cf. the contrast with the studies in
French and Dutch by Isel and Bacri and by Vroomen and de Gelder, respectively). But
note that the present results are in fact consistent with those from Gow and Gordon
(1995), who failed to observe priming from words in sentences such as tulips to kiss, an
associate of lips.
Experiment 1B was therefore an attempt to relate the Wndings of Experiment 1A to the
other literature on the activation of embedded words. The primes used in Experiment 1A
were placed in sentence contexts. It is important to note, however, that the results with
non-embedded primes in Experiment 1A validate our materials: The associative relation-
ships between the monosyllabic words and their related targets are strong enough to
produce a signiWcant priming eVect. That is, the failure to Wnd an eVect with the embedded-
word primes is not because the associations between the embedded words and their related
targets were too weak or too variable.
2.2. Experiment 1B: Prime words in sentences
2.2.1. Method
2.2.1.1. Materials and design. The primes from Experiment 1A (monosyllabic words, bisyl-
labic carriers with embedded words, and Wllers) were placed in sentence contexts. Those for
the experimental trials are listed in Appendix B. Each of the sentences was constructed
such that context before the critical prime word was not predictive of the prime. The exper-
imental sentences were built in pairs, one for each pair of monosyllabic and bisyllabic
items, using as much overlapping material as possible, and such that the embedded words
in the bisyllabic primes appeared the same number of syllables into their sentences as the
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ing the Wrst syllable of the bisyllabic word with a function word consisting of a reduced syl-
lable (e.g., the sentence pair “They planned sedate and placid meals with the ambassador”;
“They planned a date and place to meet with the ambassador”). The visual targets were the
same as those used in Experiment 1A. Practice trials were generated by constructing an
additional 10 prime–target pairs. These primes, along with the 10 from Experiment 1A,
were placed in sentence contexts to produce 20 practice trials.
2.2.1.2. Procedure. The sentences were recorded by a male native speaker who was a
trained phonetician. This was not the same speaker who recorded the stimuli for Experi-
ment 1A. He read each of the sentences aloud in a clear and natural way to convey the
meaning, using neutral intonation (i.e., in a matter-of-fact fashion, with no contrastive
accents). He also attempted to match the prosodic contours of each of the pairs of experi-
mental sentences. The auditory stimuli were then prepared in the same way as in
Experiment 1A.
The equipment and basic procedure were identical to Experiment 1A. Note, however,
that the sentence materials were played in their entirety; they did not terminate at the oVset
of the prime word. Participants thus heard portions of the post-prime parts of the sen-
tences as they made their lexical decisions to the visual targets. In contrast to Experiment
1A, the materials were split into two blocks. The order of presentation of the two blocks
was counterbalanced across participants. Within each block there was a single randomiza-
tion of the materials in each of the four lists. That is, the matched embedded/non-embed-
ded sentence pairs and all of the Wllers appeared in the same order in each block.
Instructions to participants were the same as in Experiment 1A, with the exception that
they were told that they would be asked questions about the sentences afterwards rather
than being told to repeat the primes. At the end of the experiment participants were shown
twenty written sentences, half of which had appeared in the experiment. They were
instructed to indicate whether they had heard the sentences in the experiment.
2.2.1.3. Participants. The listeners in the 0 ms ISI condition were 44 students from St.
John’s College, Cambridge, and Churchill College, Cambridge. Data from 12 participants
were rejected because they scored less than 70% correct on the recognition test. In the
500 ms ISI condition there were 47 participants, who were members of Downing College,
Cambridge or of the MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit volunteer panel. The data
from Wfteen participants were rejected because they scored less than 70% correct on the
recognition test.
2.2.2. Results
The mean recognition scores for the participants who passed the recognition test were
79% for the 0 ms ISI condition and 80% for the 500 ms ISI condition. The lexical decision
results from Experiment 1B are shown in Tables 1 and 2. In contrast to Experiment 1A, the
main eVect of relatedness was not signiWcant in either the latency (F1 (1,56) D 2.75, p > .1;
F2 (1,31) D 1.19, p > .2) or the error analysis (Fs < 1). Responses to related targets were thus
not signiWcantly faster than responses to unrelated targets, whether the primes were
embedded or not. Furthermore, there was no eVect of embedding (latencies and errors,
Fs < 1), and ISI was signiWcant only in the items analysis of latencies (F1 < 1;
F2 (1,31) D 4.33, p < .05). The only other signiWcant results involved subject groups.
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(F (3,56) D 3.18, p < .05) and a four-way interaction between groups, ISI, relatedness and
embedding (F (3,56) D 3.57, p < .02). In the error analysis there was a two-way interaction
between groups and relatedness (F1 (3,56) D 2.77, p < .05).
2.2.3. Discussion
Experiment 1B produced a non-signiWcant priming eVect of about 8 ms, and no interac-
tion between priming and embedding. The experiment thus failed to replicate Shillcock
(1990), despite the overall similarity of the two studies. More strikingly, there was also no
evidence of associative priming for the non-embedded words. This stands in contrast to the
results of many previous studies using this paradigm, discussed in the introduction, which
have found associative priming when the primes were words which the speaker intended
(i.e., when they were not embedded words).
As we noted in the introduction, there are two previous studies that also failed to Wnd
cross-modal associative priming eVects with non-embedded words in sentences. Both
Tabossi (1988a) and Williams (1988) found no priming when the target words were not
related to the overall meaning of the rest of the sentence containing prime words. Williams
did, however, Wnd associative priming from the same prime words presented in lists of
unrelated items. The straightforward implication of these Wndings is that cross-modal asso-
ciative priming is not sensitive to automatic lexical activation. Words must be semantically
activated to permit listeners to construct a semantic interpretation of the sentence, but this
activation need not produce priming.
Experiments 1A and 1B produced the same pattern of priming as reported by Williams
(1988). Words that failed to produce priming in sentences did produce priming when pre-
sented in isolation. It is thus possible that the non-embedded words in Experiment 1A pro-
duced facilitation of target responses because they were the only available context, while
the same words in Experiment 1B did not produce facilitation because the meanings of the
sentences up to and including the primes were not strongly associated with the meanings of
the targets. This account might also explain the results for the embedded words, not only
those in sentences (where again the meaning of the sentence fragments would not be
strongly associated with the meanings of the targets) but also in isolation. If the “eVective
context” for the embedded word condition in Experiment 1A was the meaning of the bisyl-
labic carrier words, then again no priming would be predicted based on the associations of
the embedded words.
One way of interpreting this eVective context explanation is that the task of attending
to the sentence level interpretation requires the listener to inhibit word-level representa-
tions. This would be consistent with the arguments of Marí-BeVa et al. (2000). Another
way of interpreting this explanation is in terms of compound cueing theory (RatcliV &
McKoon, 1988). Sentences and individual words lead to diVerent compound cues, and
may therefore produce quite diVerent patterns of priming. But whatever the exact expla-
nation for variations in eVective context might be, a clear prediction of this account is
that it ought to be possible to induce an associative priming eVect with sentential materi-
als. If a manipulation can cause the meaning of the prime to be part of the target’s eVec-
tive context, then associative priming should result. Experiments 3 and 4 addressed this
issue, and hence also examined the apparent discrepancy between the results of Experi-
ment 1B and those from the previous literature showing associative facilitation in
sentence contexts.
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tion made no contribution to the results (it only interacted with the group factor).
Although ISI can provide useful information on the decay of associative priming when
such priming occurs (e.g., Swinney, 1979), the prerequisites for its usefulness were not met
in our experiment since no priming eVects appeared at all.
The next two experiments used identity priming rather than associative priming.
Although identity priming might not be sensitive to conceptual activation, it should be sen-
sitive to activation of phonological representations. Experiment 2 was therefore an attempt
to tap into the activation of the phonological representations of both embedded and non-
embedded words. This comparison should be informative about whether there is a distinc-
tion between type and token representations of phonological form. SpeciWcally, if identity
priming reXects the activation of the token representations which enter into lexical compe-
tition, there should be facilitatory priming from tokens which win the competition
(the non-embedded words) and inhibitory priming from tokens which lose the competition
(the embedded words). Furthermore, the comparison of the pattern of identity priming
results with the previous associative priming data should be informative about the rela-
tionship between phonological and semantic levels of lexical representation. The extent to
which the pattern of identity priming mirrors what was found with associative priming
should reXect the independence and separability of phonological and conceptual represen-
tations in the speech comprehension system. Experiments 2A and 2B therefore employed
the same recordings of words and sentences used in Experiments 1A and 1B.
3. Experiment 2: Identity priming
3.1. Experiment 2A: Prime words in isolation
3.1.1. Method
Experiment 2A used the same materials and general procedure as Experiment 1A, but
used identity priming rather than associative priming. As a consequence of the change
from associative to identity priming, the words in unrelated pairs appeared both as audi-
tory primes and visual targets in the same experimental list. For example, the unrelated
pair come-date appeared in the same list as date-come. This was also true of the unrelated
embedded pairs (e.g., sedate-come and succumb-date appeared in the same list). The experi-
mental materials were therefore split into two blocks such that only one member of a
repeated pair appeared in any one block. Half of the participants received the blocks in one
order, and the other half received the other order. To ensure that form overlap itself was
not a reliable cue to whether the target was a word or not, we also altered 24 non-word
Wller trials so that the non-words had phonological overlap with the auditory primes. For
example, swing-dactor became swing-swib, session-mip became session-sessiom and regard-
littuce became regard-gart. Also, Wller trials that had consisted of related bisyllabic words
(concern-worry) became identity primed bisyllabic Wllers (concern-concern), so that identity
targets were not always monosyllabic. We also ensured that both monosyllabic and bisyl-
labic primes were as likely to be followed by a word as by a non-word. ISI was always 0 ms.
3.1.1.1. Participants. There were 32 participants from Girton College, Cambridge, Fitzwil-
liam College, Cambridge, and the MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit volunteer
panel.
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As in Experiment 1A, participants were very accurate at repeating the prime words; they
made errors, overall, on fewer than 2% of experimental trials. In both this experiment and
Experiment 2B there were no signiWcant eVects or interactions involving the order in which
the unrelated pairs appeared. Order was therefore not included as a factor in any of the
analyses reported. The results from Experiment 2A are shown in Table 3. As in Experiment
1A, responses to related targets were substantially faster than those to unrelated targets
(mean diVerence: 61 ms; F1(1,28) D 32.65, p < .0001; F2 (1,31) D 15.23, p < .0005). There was,
however, a signiWcant interaction between relatedness and embedding (F1 (1,28) D 26.61,
p < .0001; F2 (1,31) D 21.01, p < .0001). The priming eVect was 136 ms for monosyllabic,
non-embedded words (F1 (1,28) D 55.14, p < .0001; F2 (1,31) D 79.34, p < .0001), but ¡15 ms
for embedded words (Fs < 1). As a consequence of the large priming eVect for non-embed-
ded words, responses to targets following these words were faster overall than responses to
targets following embedded words (mean diVerence: 80 ms; F1 (1,28) D 56.90, p < .0001;
F2 (1,31) D 33.78, p < .0001). There was also an interaction between embedding and groups
(F1 (3,28) D 3.15, p < .05).
In the error analysis, there was no signiWcant eVect of relatedness (Fs < 1), but there was
an interaction between relatedness and embedding (F1 (1,28) D 5.77, p < .05;
F2 (1,31) D 4.58, p < .05). There were fewer errors to related targets following non-embed-
ded words, and more to related words following embedded words. However, relatedness
was not signiWcant in the separate analyses of non-embedded words (F1 (1,28) D 2.15, p > .1;
F2 (1,31) D 1.63, p > .2) or embedded words (F1 (1,28) D 3.57, p > .05; F2 (1,31) D 3.49,
p > .05). Relatedness also interacted with groups (F1 (3,28) D 4.51, p < .05). In line with the
latency analysis, there were signiWcantly fewer errors for targets following monosyllabic
words than embedded words (F1 (1,28) D 8.40, p < .01; F2 (1,31) D 5.02, p < .05).
3.1.3. Discussion
The general pattern of data from Experiment 2A is very similar to that observed in
Experiment 1A. There was facilitation for non-embedded words, but not for embedded
words. In fact, there was even a hint that targets related to embedded words were inhibited.
This is in line with previous identity priming data. As mentioned in the introduction, trom-
bone-bone pairs in Marslen-Wilson et al. (1994) produced a statistically non-signiWcant
inhibitory eVect of 12 ms. Shatzman (2006) observed statistically signiWcant inhibition
Table 3
Identity priming results, Experiment 2 (inter stimulus interval D 0 ms)
Mean reaction times (in milliseconds, from target onset) and mean percentage error rates for lexical decisions to
visual target words in each priming condition.
Experiment Auditory 
materials
Measure Non-embedded Prime Embedded prime
Prime–target relationship Prime–target relationship
Related Unrelated Related Unrelated
date-date come-date sedate-date succumb-date
2A Isolated words RT 605 741 760 745
Error 1.2 2.7 7.4 3.9
2B Sentences RT 587 634 682 626
Error 0.8 4.7 3.5 5.1
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examined identity priming in sentences.
3.2. Experiment 2B: Prime words in sentences
3.2.1. Method
Experiment 2B used the same sentence recordings used in Experiment 1B, and the visual
targets used in Experiment 2A. In this experiment, half of the repeated words (e.g., date-
come and come-date) always appeared in one order (visual target before auditory prime, or
vice versa) and half always appeared in the other order. Also, instead of informing partici-
pants that they would be asked questions about the sentences, we required participants to
repeat some of the sentences aloud immediately after they heard them. All experimental
trials and four Wller trials with non-word targets were followed by the prompt “Please
repeat the sentence.” Participants’ repetitions were recorded on audio tape. Repetitions
were considered to be acceptable if they included a reasonable paraphrase of the experi-
mental sentence at least up to the prime word and the prime word itself. The criterion for
inclusion in this experiment (and all subsequent experiments which used sentence materi-
als) was that a participant make no more than six errors in repetition. The implications of
this procedural change from Experiment 1B will be addressed in a later experiment.
3.2.1.1. Participants. Thirty-two students from Robinson College, Cambridge,
participated.
3.2.2. Results
The results from Experiment 2B are shown in Table 3. Overall, responses to related tar-
gets were no faster than responses to unrelated targets (Fs < 1). However, there was a sig-
niWcant interaction between relatedness and embedding (F1 (1,28) D 46.27, p < .0001;
F2 (1,31) D 23.21, p < .0001). As in the case of identity priming with isolated words, there
was a signiWcant facilitatory eVect of relatedness for targets following non-embedded
words (mean diVerence: 47 ms; F1 (1,28) D 21.38, p < .0001; F2 (1,31) D 10.53, p < .005).
However, in contrast to the previous experiment, the inhibitory eVect observed with
embedded primes was also signiWcant (mean diVerence: ¡56 ms; F1 (1,28) D 15.65,
p < .0005; F2 (1,31) D 9.18, p < .005). Although response times were little diVerent to unre-
lated targets following non-embedded or embedded primes, the pattern of facilitation and
inhibition for related primes meant that responses to targets following non-embedded
primes were faster overall (F1 (1,28) D 25.08, p < .0001; F2 (1,31) D 16.88, p < .0005).
In the error analysis there was a signiWcant overall eVect of relatedness (F1 (1,28) D 4.43,
p < .05; F2 (1,31) D 6.36, p < .05). Priming was facilitatory for both non-embedded
(F1 (1,28) D 4.55, p < .05; F2 (1,31) D 8.91, p < .01) and embedded words, but the eVect for
embedded words was not signiWcant (F1 < 1; F2 (1,31) D 1.15, p > .2). The only other signiW-
cant result was an interaction of groups and embedding (F1 (3,28) D 6.86, p < .005).
3.2.3. Discussion
In contrast to associative priming, identity priming in sentences produced signiWcant
facilitation following non-embedded words. In this respect, the data are similar to the
results of both the identity priming and associative priming experiments with isolated
words. However, in addition to a facilitatory eVect with non-embedded monosyllables,
166 D. Norris et al. / Cognitive Psychology 53 (2006) 146–193there was a substantial inhibitory eVect with embedded words. This result is consistent with
one of the possibilities discussed earlier. Embedded words are initially activated, but then
they must be suppressed, and this results in negative priming. Note that it must have been
the case that embedded words are activated at some point, or else they would not be inhib-
ited relative to unrelated words. If embedded words were never activated, primes with
embedded words would have had the same eVect as unrelated primes.
One possible alternative account for the inhibition observed with embedded words is
that it reXects a checking strategy. Participants could perhaps have noticed that the targets
on related trials (e.g., date after hearing sedate) corresponded to a string that they had just
heard, and that this spoken sequence was not the same word. This could have delayed pos-
itive lexical decision latencies relative to unrelated trials. There are several reasons to disfa-
vor this account. First, it seems unlikely that participants would adopt such a checking
strategy, since it would be of no beneWt to them in performing the lexical decision task:
There were as many trials where primes were embedded related words as where they were
non-embedded related words, and related trials constituted only 20% of all trials. Second,
this account predicts that the inhibitory eVect ought to be stronger with isolated primes
than in sentences (because it should be easier to notice the overlap with isolated words).
But a stronger eVect was found in sentences than with isolated words.
The pattern of results in Experiment 2 is consistent with the operation of Shortlist
(Norris, 1994), where the initial perceptual match between the input and a lexical entry acti-
vates a token representation of that word’s phonological form. This token representation
then enters into the competition process and will be inhibited when it loses the competition to
the longer embedding word (see Fig. 1). Suppression of that lexical token representation will
then inhibit subsequent identiWcation of a visually presented instance of that word.
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 present a quite straightforward picture. Monosyl-
labic words produce a facilitatory eVect of identity priming, whether those words appear in
isolation or in sentences. Identity priming from embedded words tends to be inhibitory,
although only signiWcantly so for sentences. In contrast, associative priming was only
found with isolated monosyllabic words. There was no sign of associative priming in sen-
tences, and no sign of inhibition with embedded words. Although this result is consistent
with Williams (1988), other studies have found associative priming from words in sen-
tences contexts. Associative priming in sentence contexts has been found with complete
words (e.g., Swinney, 1979; Tabossi, 1996), with embedded words (e.g., Shillcock, 1990) and
with word fragments (e.g., Zwitserlood, 1989). To address this apparent discrepancy
between our results and those of these other studies, we conducted a series of six experi-
ments (Experiments 3A–C and 4A–C) that attempt to establish conditions that will pro-
duce cross-modal associative priming using stimuli based on those used in Experiment 1B.
These are reported in the next section.
Experiment 3 examines three design factors that might have mitigated against Wnding
priming in Experiment 1B. One possibility was that the recognition task used in Experi-
ment 1B might not have induced listeners to attend carefully to the sentences. Experiment
3A therefore replicated the 0 ms ISI conditions of Experiment 1B, but with the secondary
task used in Experiment 2B. Listeners were required to repeat all of the experimental sen-
tences and a few Wller sentences verbatim, immediately after they heard each of them.
A second possibility was that the cross-modal associative priming eVects observed in
other studies may have been due, at least in part, to strategic factors. Participants may have
become aware of the relationships between primes and targets in these experiments.
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relationships. For example, some studies have found priming when only sentence frag-
ments were presented, that is, when the auditory material terminated with the critical word
or word fragment (Tabossi et al., 2000; Zwitserlood, 1989; Zwitserlood & Schriefers, 1995).
When the last word the listener hears is related to the visual target, this is likely to draw
attention to the association between prime and target, and to disrupt the interpretation of
the sentence. The priming eVect could thus be caused by listeners explicitly checking for
these associations.
In Experiments 3B and 3C, we therefore examined two factors that might draw partici-
pants’ attention to the relation between primes and targets. In Experiment 3B we varied
the proportion of related trials. In our previous experiments, half of the related experimen-
tal trials had embedded prime words. Participants may be less likely to become aware of
the relationships between these primes and their targets than of the relationships between
the non-embedded primes and their targets. To increase the likelihood that subjects would
become aware of the prime–target relationships, we removed the embedded word primes
from the experiment. Experiment 3B was thus a repetition of Experiment 3A, but using
only the monosyllabic, non-embedded primes.
In Experiment 3C we took a more extreme measure to try and draw participants’ atten-
tion to the relationship between prime and target. As noted above, experiments where the
speech signal terminates after the prime (as in, e.g., Zwitserlood, 1989), have fairly consis-
tently found associative priming. Experiment 3C was therefore identical to 3B, but with the
sentences truncated at the end of the prime.
4. Experiments 3A–C: Associative priming, procedural manipulations
4.1. Method
All three versions of this experiment were identical in terms of procedure to the 0 ms ISI
condition of Experiment 1B except that participants were required to repeat sentences as in
Experiment 2B. In Experiment 3A, this procedural change was the only diVerence from the
0 ms ISI condition of Experiment 1B. In Experiment 3B, however, participants heard only
the versions of the experimental sentences in which the prime was a non-embedded word.
Consequently the counter-balancing required only two presentation lists, in contrast to the
four lists used in the previous experiments. For sentences in the practice session in which
the visual target was related to an embedded word, the target word was replaced with one
related to the meaning of the bisyllabic carrier word. The materials and procedure were
otherwise identical to Experiment 3A.
Experiment 3C was identical to Experiment 3B except that sentences were truncated at
the end of the prime. To avoid audible clicks, the audio signal was ramped down to zero
over the 50 ms following the end of the prime. The truncated versions of the stimuli were
pretested to check whether this led to any diYculties in recognizing the prime. Five listen-
ers from the MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit volunteer panel, who did not partic-
ipate in any of the main experiments, were presented with the truncated sentences and
asked to write down the last word they heard. All of the experimental prime words were
always reported correctly except one (crease was heard by one listener as increase). Trunca-
tion therefore did not induce perceptual distortions at the oVset of the experimental
primes. Four Wller primes, however, tended to be misheard. New versions of these Wllers
168 D. Norris et al. / Cognitive Psychology 53 (2006) 146–193were therefore made in which the truncation point was shifted to a little later in time, thus
improving prime perceptiblity. Minimal changes were made to instructions and procedures
to adjust for the shorter auditory stimuli; in particular, the instructions were changed to
refer to “the beginnings of sentences” and stated that, when required, participants should
“say out aloud all that you heard of the last sentence as accurately as you can.” These oral
responses were recorded.
4.1.1. Participants
Participants in Experiment 3A were 33 members of the MRC Cognition and Brain Sci-
ences Unit volunteer panel. One participant’s data were excluded from the analysis because
the participant failed the repetition test. In Experiment 3B, participants were 32 students
from St. Catherine’s College, Cambridge. The 32 participants in Experiment 3C were also
from the MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit volunteer panel.
4.2. Results
The results from Experiment 3 are shown in Tables 1 and 2. In common with Experi-
ment 1B, there were no fully signiWcant priming eVects in the experiments using complete
sentences. In Experiment 3A, there was no relatedness eVect in either latencies (Fs < 1) or
errors (F1 (1,28) D 1.68, p > .2; F2 (1,31) D 3.21, p > .05), and no other eVects were signiWcant.
The move from a recognition task to a repetition task actually decreased the priming eVect
slightly, from 8 to ¡10 ms. In Experiment 3B, the eVect of relatedness (for the non-embed-
ded primes only) was facilitatory (10 ms), but again was not signiWcant in the latency anal-
ysis (F1(1,30) D 1.58, p > .20; F2 < 1). Although there were fewer errors to related than
unrelated targets, this diVerence was signiWcant only in the subjects analysis
(F1 (1,30) D 4.62, p < .05; F2 (1,31) D 3.83, p > .05).
In contrast to Experiments 3A and 3B, there was a 22-ms priming eVect in Experiment
3C that was signiWcant in the subjects analysis (F1 (1,30) D 6.83, p < .05), although it just
missed being signiWcant in the items analysis (F2 (1,31) D 4.04, p D .053). Related items were
responded to signiWcantly more accurately than unrelated items (F1 (1,30) D 6.91, p < .05;
F2 (1,31) D 4.86, p < .05). The only other signiWcant results were interactions between prim-
ing and groups in both the latency (F1 (1,30) D 6.83, p < .05) and in the error
(F1 (1,30) D 6.91, p < .05) analyses.
We also conducted an analysis comparing Experiment 3B with Experiment 3C. While
the overall eVect of priming in the combined analysis was signiWcant (F1 (1,60) D 7.60,
p < .01; F2 (1,31) D 6.15, p < .02) there was no signiWcant interaction between priming and
experiment (F1 (1,60) D 1.03, p < .5; F2 (1,31) < 1).
4.3. Discussion
The results of all of the associative priming experiments so far are consistent with the
eVective context hypothesis: It is only when the auditory stimuli consist of the non-embed-
ded primes in isolation (i.e., as in Experiment 1A) or at the ends of truncated sentences (as
in Experiment 3C) that a statistically signiWcant priming eVect emerges. Changing the sec-
ondary task (Experiment 1B versus 3A) failed to induce a priming eVect for either embed-
ded or non-embedded primes. Likewise, increasing the proportion of clearly related trials
produced a non-signiWcant priming eVect for non-embedded primes of only 10 ms
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to their primes, participants failed to use those associations to bias their lexical decision
performance. Experiment 3C demonstrates that the stimuli from Experiment 3B produce a
signiWcant priming eVect when presentation of the sentence is terminated at the oVset of the
prime. This is consistent with the conclusions we drew from our review of the priming liter-
ature where we noted that many of the studies that had reported cross-modal associative
priming had stopped presentation of the sentences immediately after the prime word. We
suggested that this manipulation was likely to increase the prominence of the prime word
in the sentence.
These results make one further point. It is conceivable that part of the reason for our
failure to obtain priming eVects might be limitations on the perceptibility of the prime
words (although any such problem would need to apply to both of our speakers). For
example, it might be the case that isolated words were articulated more clearly than the
same words in sentences and thus isolated words were more eVective primes (cf. Boothroyd
& Nittrouer, 1988; Miller, Heise, & Lichten, 1951). However, Experiment 3C shows that
exactly the same acoustic tokens of the words can produce priming when the sentence is
truncated. Whatever the reason for our failure to obtain associative priming in Experi-
ments 3A and 3B, it cannot be attributable to problems with the acoustic realization of the
words themselves, or we would not have found priming here either.
Note that although there is no signiWcant interaction between the size of the priming
eVect and whether or not the sentence was truncated, this does not aVect the point we wish
to make here. There is no reason to expect that a signiWcant diVerence should always
appear in the size of the priming eVect in complete and truncated sentences. This manipula-
tion is just one of a number of factors that may increase the likelihood of observing prim-
ing. The important Wnding is that when we model our experiment after the design that has
most commonly produced a priming eVect, we also observe priming.
The results from the secondary tasks in Experiments 1B and 3A and 3B show that
participants were attending to the sentences, and recognizing the words of those sen-
tences. Presumably, they were also constructing interpretations of those utterances. It
therefore appears that the eVective context explanation for these results may be correct.
If the eVective context is sentence meaning, then there will be no signs of priming if the
meaning of the prime word is not yet being incorporated into the interpretation of the
sentence. This account suggests that if listeners could be encouraged to incorporate a
richer word meaning representation into the representation of the sentence, associative
priming might emerge. We tested this prediction in Experiment 4. We attempted to
encourage listeners to process the primes more deeply. We predicted the appearance of
associative priming if listeners were to involve the meaning of the primes in their senten-
tial interpretations.
In Experiment 4B, we modiWed the sentences by providing semantically richer contexts
for the prime words. One way to encourage greater depth of processing on particular
words in sentence contexts is to make them the semantic focus of their carrier sentences
(Blutner & Sommer, 1988; Cutler & Fodor, 1979). Blutner and Sommer, for example, used
cross-modal priming to study lexical ambiguity in the context of manipulations of sentence
focus. Their experiment was similar to the Swinney (1979) cross-modal priming study, but
they presented two sentences on each trial. For example, the critical sentence “The scenery
with the mast disappointed the visitors of the gallery” (their English translation of one of
their German sentences, where the German word Mast is lexically ambiguous, meaning
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with either “Which scenery disappointed the visitors?” or “Which visitors did the scenery
disappoint?” With an ISI of 0 ms they found priming to both readings of the ambiguous
words, but only when those words were focused. At a 350-ms ISI, the biased words pro-
duced priming, regardless of whether or not they were focused, and the alternative readings
never did.
It was not possible to construct focus-biasing lead-in sentences for the sentences used in
Experiments 1B, therefore the sentences themselves were manipulated instead. The original
sentences were designed to be semantically neutral. As a consequence they tended to have
abstract or non-speciWc referents, particularly in the early (pre-prime) sections. In the
majority of cases the subject of the sentence was a pronoun (e.g., “They planned a dateƒ,”
“He gave up the seatƒ”; see Appendix B). We provided richer semantic contexts by replac-
ing these pronouns with nouns, by marking those nouns with adjectives, or by adding
adverbial qualiWers (e.g., “The cultural delegation planned a dateƒ,” “The businessman
immediately gave up the seatƒ”; see Appendix C). We hoped that these contexts would
encourage participants to process the sentences, and, in particular, the primes more deeply.
If this manipulation were to make the meanings of the primes part of the eVective contexts
of the targets, associative priming would result.
As the speaker who recorded the original sentence materials was no longer available, we
had to use a diVerent speaker. This raised the possibility that, if we were to Wnd priming
with the new materials, this could be attributable to diVerences between the two speakers
rather than to diVerences in the sentence contexts. Given the elusive nature of cross-modal
associative priming in sentence contexts, the possibility must exist that the results could be
inXuenced by characteristics of the speaker. We therefore decided to begin by replicating
Experiment 3A with recordings made by a new speaker. Recording conditions and stimu-
lus preparation were the same as in Experiment 1B. The new speaker was a male native
speaker of British English (the third author), who, like the original speaker, produced the
sentences using neutral intonation contours.
5. Experiment 4: Associative priming
5.1. Experiment 4A: Replication
5.1.1. Method
New recordings were made of the sentences used in Experiments 1B, 2B and 3. The pro-
cedure was as in Experiment 3A. Participants were 32 students from St. John’s College,
Cambridge.
5.1.2. Results
The results are shown in Tables 1 and 2. The overall priming eVect was once again
slightly inhibitory (¡3 ms) and was not signiWcant in either the latency or error analyses
(Fs < 1). No other eVects were signiWcant.
5.1.3. Discussion
The results of Experiment 4A replicate those of Experiment 3A. The absence of priming
in Experiments 1B, 3A, and 3B therefore cannot readily be attributable to any peculiarities
of the speaker.
D. Norris et al. / Cognitive Psychology 53 (2006) 146–193 1715.2. Experiment 4B: Rich context
5.2.1. Method
The experimental sentences were revised such that their pre-prime portions provided a
richer semantic context (see Appendix C). The sentence pairs were still matched with
respect to the number of syllables before the (embedded or non-embedded) prime. Nine of
the Wller sentences were also revised to match the style of the new experimental sentences.
These materials were recorded by the speaker used in Experiment 4A. The sentences were
again produced with neutral intonation contours. The experiment was otherwise identical
to Experiment 4A.
5.2.1.1. Participants. Thirty-three students, either from Girton College, Cambridge, or the
MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit volunteer panel, participated. The data from one
participant, who failed the repetition test, were excluded.
5.2.2. Results
The results of Experiment 4B are shown in Tables 1 and 2. For non-embedded words,
the priming eVect was 7 ms. For embedded words there was an inhibitory eVect of 8 ms. No
eVect of relatedness or embedding was signiWcant in either latencies or errors (all Fs < 1).
The interaction between relatedness and embedding was not signiWcant in either the
latency analysis (F1 D 1.31, p > .2; F2 < 1) or in errors (Fs < 1).
5.2.3. Discussion
The manipulation of sentence context clearly failed to produce a priming eVect. There
was again no associative priming, from either the monosyllabic words embedded in bisyl-
labic carriers or even the non-embedded versions of these words. Remember, however, that
these non-embedded words did produce priming when they were spoken in isolation
(Experiment 1A) and when the (neutral) sentences were truncated after the prime (Experi-
ment 3C). The associative relationships between primes and targets were therefore robust
enough to produce priming under at least some circumstances. It is still possible that an
even richer context (such as the long multi-clausal sentences used by Cutler, 1986, and
Lucas, 1987) would have had greater inXuence.
In Experiment 4C, however, we made a diVerent kind of attempt to demonstrate asso-
ciative priming from non-embedded words in sentence contexts. We did so by manipulat-
ing the prosodic structure of the sentences. In all our experiments so far with sentence
materials, the sentences had neutral intonation contours. SpeciWcally, there were no con-
trastive accents marking particular words as being more salient than the other words in the
sentences. This was done to match the sentences better (e.g., to avoid obvious prosodic
diVerences between the sentences with embedded primes and those with non-embedded
primes) and to avoid drawing the listeners’ attention to (or away from) the prime words.
But this may have had the eVect of discouraging listeners from fully processing the mean-
ing of the sentences. The matter-of-fact style of the speakers did not stimulate the listeners’
interest in the content of the sentences (and note also that the secondary tasks could be
completed satisfactorily with only a relatively shallow analysis of the sentences). It is possi-
ble that the lack of associative priming in Experiments 1B, 3A, 3B, 4A, and 4B may thus
have resulted from shallow processing of the primes, which in turn was encouraged by the
neutral prosody of the sentences. Note that this possibility is consistent with the eVective
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sentence fragment that does not involve the meaning of the prime to any signiWcant extent,
there should be no associative priming.
The sentences used in Experiment 4C therefore had non-neutral prosodic contours. Spe-
ciWcally, the sentences varied in the placement of contrastive accents. The non-embedded
primes from the preceding experiments (e.g., date) were presented in two versions of the
same sentence, one in which the prime received a contrastive accent (“He suggested that it
was really the DATE of the election that mattered”), and one in which a later word in the
sentence was accented (“He suggested that it was really the date of the ELECTION that
mattered”). Note that it was not possible to Wnd two contrastive accent locations in each of
the sentence frames from Experiment 1B, nor in those from Experiment 4B. New sentences
were therefore constructed for each of the non-embedded primes. The same targets as in
the earlier experiments were used, however. Contrastive accent was chosen as the prosodic
variable because it has semantic implications: A particular scenario is contrasted with an
alternative possibility (e.g., in the Wrst of the above examples, it is the DATE of the election
that mattered, rather than some other aspect of the election, in the second, it is the date of
the ELECTION, rather than some other date). Contrastive accent thus stimulates semantic
analysis.
Two predictions about the eVects of this manipulation were tested. One possible out-
come was that associative priming would be found when the prime words were accented,
but not when they were deaccented (i.e., when another word was accented). Accented
words are processed diVerently from deaccented words (see Cutler, in press, Cutler, Dahan,
& van Donselaar, 1997, for reviews). For example, Cutler (1976) has shown that listeners
use the prosodic contour preceding an accented word to predict where an accent will occur,
and Akker and Cutler (2003) demonstrated that this prediction indeed serves the purpose
of locating the semantic focus of the utterance. Furthermore, Dahan, Tanenhaus, and
Chambers (2002) have shown that the discourse implications of an accented word (whether
it is a given or a new entity) can be inferred very quickly, during the processing of the Wrst
syllable of the accented word. If accent thus encourages listeners to attend to the words in
accented/focussed positions, and if discourse-level information about accented words can
be rapidly retrieved, then it is possible that the meaning of accented words will be accessed
quickly, and associative priming may then result. If deeper semantic analysis is limited to
accented words, there should be no priming from deaccented primes. An alternative out-
come, however, was that there would be a priming eVect on both accented and deaccented
primes. Such a Wnding would suggest that the presence of an accent anywhere in a sentence
(or indeed of contrastive accents in the experiment as a whole) is suYcient to increase
meaning-level processing of the sentences. Either of these outcomes, in contrast to the null
eVects with the complete versions of the prosodically neutral sentences in the previous
experiments, would suggest that the prosodic structure of sentences has an important role
to play in the way in which spoken sentences are processed.
5.3. Experiment 4C: Contrastive accent
5.3.1. Method
New sentences were constructed based on the non-embedded primes used previously.
To increase the power of the experiment to detect associative priming we presented listen-
ers with only the non-embedded primes, as in Experiment 3B. Each sentence was
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tence, either the prime word or a word later in the sentence. These materials are listed in
Appendix D. Some of the Wller sentences were also revised to facilitate the placement of a
contrastive accent in each of those sentences. Accent location in the Wller sentences was
varied such that, across the experiment as a whole, accents appeared in a variety of posi-
tions in the sentences, and were not always placed on words which were followed by a
visual target. The procedure was otherwise identical to Experiment 4B. The sentences were
recorded by the same speaker who recorded the materials for Experiments 4A and 4B.
5.3.1.1. Participants. Thirty-two members of the MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit
volunteer panel participated.
5.3.2. Results
The results from Experiment 4C are shown in Table 4. Two items were excluded from
all analyses: those involving the prime–target pairs rock-hard and vat-tax. Due to an over-
sight, the rock sentence contained the word harder (see Appendix D). The tax set was
matched to the hard set. Related words were responded to signiWcantly faster than unre-
lated words (mean diVerence: 34 ms; F1 (1,28) D 17.04, p < .0005; F2 (1,29) D 10.46, p < .005).
Targets following accented words were responded to more slowly than targets following
deaccented words, although this eVect was signiWcant in the subjects analysis only
(F1 (1,28) D 5.31, p < .05; F2 (1,29) D 3.62, p > .05). The priming eVect for accented words
(43 ms) was signiWcant when analyzed separately (F1 (1,28) D 9.27, p < .005; F2 (1,29) D 8.47,
p < .01) but the priming eVect for deaccented words (24 ms) was only signiWcant by subjects
(F1 (1,28) D 4.87, p < .05; F2 (1,29) D 1.48, p > .2). There was, however, no signiWcant interac-
tion between relatedness and accent (F1 (1,28) D 1.04, p > .3; F2 (1,29) D 1.44, p > .2).
In the error analysis the only signiWcant results were an eVect of relatedness for accented
targets (F1 (1,28) D 5.30, p < .05; F2 (1,29) D 2.07, p > .1) and an interaction between accent
and relatedness (F1 (1,28) D 5.06, p < .05; F2 (1,29) D 2.83, p > .1), both of which were signiW-
cant only by subjects.
5.3.3. Discussion
In contrast to all the preceding experiments with materials consisting of complete sen-
tences, Experiment 4C produced reliable associative priming. This suggests that sentence
prosody can inXuence the way in which words’ meanings are incorporated into the overall
meaning of a sentence. When prime words appeared in prosodically neutral sentences,
Table 4
Associative priming results, Experiment 4C (inter stimulus interval D 0 ms)
Mean reaction times (RT, in milliseconds, from target onset) and mean percentage error rates for lexical decisions
to visual target words in each priming condition.
Measure Accented prime Deaccented prime
Prime–target relationship Prime–target relationship
Related Unrelated Related Unrelated
DATE-time COME-time date-time come-time
RT 588 631 576 600
Error 0.4 2.1 3.0 1.2
174 D. Norris et al. / Cognitive Psychology 53 (2006) 146–193there was no detectable priming. When exactly the same targets were preceded by exactly
the same primes, but where the primes were in sentences containing contrastive accents,
priming was observed.
The results of Experiment 4C suggest further that contrastive accent acts not to increase
semantic processing on the accented word alone, but rather to encourage fuller processing
of the meaning of the sentence as a whole. If the accented primes alone had facilitated tar-
get responses, this would have suggested that words bearing accent are processed more
deeply, such that semantic associates of those words are activated. But there was also facil-
itation when contrastive accents were applied later in the sentences than the critical prime
words. Although this eVect was not signiWcant in the by-items analysis, the interaction of
relatedness and accent was not signiWcant. These Wndings suggest that there was indeed
some activation of the associates of the deaccented primes. Deeper semantic processing of
words other than the accented word in a sentence may be triggered by the contrastive func-
tion of the accent, such that listeners are encouraged not only to consider the meaning of
the sentence, but also to construct the alternative scenario implicit in the utterance. In the
deaccented date sentence (“He suggested that it was really the date of the ELECTION that
mattered”), for example, listeners may have considered the possibility of dates of other
events, and hence have activated associated words, such as the target time.
The results of Experiment 4C raise the possibility that the intonation or prosody of the
materials in previous studies showing associative priming in sentence contexts could have
encouraged more extensive processing of the primes, and hence could have induced the
priming eVects. We therefore contacted the authors of studies for which there is as yet no
obvious explanation for the priming that was observed (i.e., those studies in which the
primes were not at the ends of sentences or clauses, or at a truncation point, and in which,
in addition, the associative relationship between prime and target was not relevant to the
meaning of the sentence). Shillcock (personal communication) pointed out that the materi-
als in Shillcock (1990) were spoken in a slow and careful manner. Swinney (personal com-
munication) indicated that main stress may have been placed on the prime words in the
Swinney (1979) sentences. We were sent the materials from the Tabossi et al. (1995) study,
however, and these sentences were spoken with a fairly neutral intonation. A question
remains though as to how much weight to assign to the conWct between these results. There
may be many unpublished studies which, like Experiment 1B, failed to detect associative
priming in semantically and prosodically neutral sentence contexts. That is, it may well be
that the normal pattern under these conditions is that of no associative priming.
Because the sentences in Experiment 4C were necessarily diVerent from those used in
the other sentence experiments, there is a possibility that the primes in 4C might somehow
have been more predictable or plausible than those in the previous sentences. To investi-
gate this possibility we conducted a further experiment to compare the original sentence
materials from Experiment 1B with those from 4C in both a cloze procedure and in a plau-
sibility rating task.
5.4. Experiment 4D: Control data
5.4.1. Method
Both the cloze and rating tasks were based on the sentences with monosyllabic
primes used initially in Experiment 1B (Appendix B) and those used in Experiment 4C
(Appendix D). Twelve participants saw the sentences from Experiment 1B, and 12 saw
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rating task.
In the cloze task participants were shown written versions of the sentences up to, but
excluding, the prime word. The instructions were as follows: “Below is a list of the begin-
nings of some sentences. Your task is simply to read carefully the beginning of each sen-
tence and then continue the sentence by writing down a word or phrase. Please read
carefully and put down the Wrst words that spring to mind as continuations.”
The cloze task was immediately followed by the rating task. Here participants were
asked to rate the plausibility of the target, given the prime-bearing sentence, up to and
including the prime. Written sentence preambles ended with the prime word followed by
“ƒ” and the related target word, oVset to the right and printed in upper case. Beneath each
item, a 5 point rating scale was printed with labels, “unrelated,” “slightly related,”
“related,” “very related,” and “extremely related.”
5.4.1.1. Participants. Twenty-four members of the MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences
volunteer panel took part. They were similar in age range and education to previous
participants.
5.4.2. Results and discussion
As in Experiment 4C, results involving the prime–target pairs rock-hard and vat-tax
were excluded from the analyses. In the cloze task participants hardly ever produced the
prime word as a completion. The correct completion was produced 0.52% of the time for
the Experiment 1B materials and 2.34% of the time for Experiment 4C materials. The mean
rating scores for the materials for Experiments 2A and 4C were 2.77 and 3.19 respectively.
This diVerence was only signiWcant by items (F1 (1,22) D 3.45, p > .05; F2 (1,29) D 15.93,
p < .001).
The results from the cloze task show that the primes were very unpredictable in their
contexts, and, statistically, equally so across the two sets of sentences. But although the
diVerence in rated plausibility was very small, it was signiWcant in the items analysis.
Correlational tests were therefore carried out, comparing the size of the RT priming
eVects in the experiments with the rating scores. None of these correlations was signiW-
cant. It is therefore very unlikely that the small increase in rated plausibility of the
Experiment 4C materials relative to the earlier sentence materials is responsible for the
emergence of priming in Experiment 4C. The comparison of Experiments 3B and 3C
also shows that target plausibility is unlikely to be the sole cause of priming eVects: the
truncated sentence materials produced signiWcant priming in Experiment 3C, while the
full sentences in Experiment 3B did not, even though target plausibility was the same in
both experiments. It seems reasonable to conclude that the emergence of priming in
Experiment 4C was instead due, at least primarily, to the prosodic manipulation that
was introduced.
In six experiments using cross-modal associative priming in complete sentences (Experi-
ments 1B, 3A, 3B, 4A, 4B, and 4C), Experiment 4C was the only case where related targets
were responded to signiWcantly more quickly than unrelated targets. This is despite the fact
that the same words produce signiWcant associative priming when they were presented in
isolation (Experiment 1A), or at the end of a truncated sentence (Experiment 3C). As we
suggested earlier, this may be because the eVective contexts for priming (Williams, 1988)
provided by isolated words and by sentences may be diVerent. Words in isolation are the
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of the target, and associative priming should result.
The eVective context of a sentence, however, is likely to be the interpretation of the sen-
tence. We argued earlier that the construction of a sentence-level interpretation could
inhibit word-level representations, or produce a diVerent kind of representation from a
word-level representation, blocking associative priming. The results of Experiments 3C
and 4C, in combination with those of Experiments 1B, 3A, 3B, 4A, and 4B, suggest that the
richness of the interpretation of a sentence (and hence whether or not associative priming
will be found) can vary, such that sentences can nevertheless sometimes be eVective con-
texts for associative priming. One way to manipulate depth of processing of primes in sen-
tences would of course be to structure the pre-prime portions of the sentences such as to
bias interpretation toward a meaning of the prime that is associated with the target
(Tabossi, 1988a). Experiment 3C shows that manipulation of prime prominence by trunca-
tion of the speech signal can have a similar eVect. Experiment 4C shows that this can also
be achieved by manipulation of sentence prosody.
The pattern of results across our experiments is more similar to that reported by Wil-
liams (1988) and Tabossi (1988a) than to that reported by Shillcock (1990), and by others
who have found signiWcant priming eVects in sentences. In part this may be explained by
the fact that, to our knowledge, only our study and the Williams study examined priming
in both sentences and isolated words. Any researcher failing to Wnd cross-modal priming in
sentences in a single experiment might be inclined to conclude that there was a problem
with their materials, or that the experiment lacked power. The fact that both we and Wil-
liams observed priming from isolated words shows that any failure to observe priming in
sentences in these studies is not due to problems with the speciWc primes and targets used.
Furthermore, in our study, the fact that we failed to obtain priming in Wve out of seven
experiments means that any single null result cannot readily be dismissed as a type II error.
Averaging over all of the sentence conditions with non-embedded primes and complete
sentences, other than Experiment 4C which used the accent manipulation, the mean cross-
modal associative priming eVect is 3 ms. This pools data over 192 subjects. Although the
exact interpretation of this null result needs to take account of the fact that there do appear
to be conditions under which cross-modal semantic priming eVects can be obtained in sen-
tences, the simple conclusion must be that words in sentences do not automatically pro-
duce associative priming. Even when listeners hear non-embedded monosyllabic words,
where there can be no doubt that those words are accessed, this does not necessarily result
in reliable cross-modal associative priming. As we discussed in the introduction, however,
the absence of priming does not necessarily imply that there has been no lexical activation.
Cross-modal associative priming should therefore not be used to determine whether or not
embedded words are accessed in continuous speech.
6. General discussion
The priming of phonological representations of lexical forms patterns diVerently from
the priming of conceptual representations. A simple model in which the phonological and
conceptual representations of each word exist as separate but tightly linked parts of the
same lexical entry is thus not tenable.
In our 10 cross-modal priming experiments we have compared form-based (identity)
priming with associative priming, isolated word primes with sentential primes, and primes
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primes which were unintended words, spuriously embedded in longer words (such as date
in sedate). We also examined the timing of lexical activation by manipulating the prime–
target interval, and we encouraged variation in depth of processing by manipulating the
semantic complexity and prosodic structure of sentences. Together these comparisons pro-
vide a comprehensive picture of the availability of lexical representations at diVerent levels
of processing during speech comprehension.
6.1. Phonological activation
The identity priming task is assumed to tap the activation of mental representations of
the phonological form of words. Consistent with this assumption, we observed diVerences
between the identity priming eVects in Experiments 2A and 2B and the associative priming
eVects with exactly the same materials in Experiments 1A and 1B. Fig. 2 displays the mean
priming eVects across these four experiments. EVects were not the same in the two types of
priming task. For example, there was reliable identity priming from non-embedded words
in sentences (Experiment 2B), but no associative priming from these materials (Experiment
1B). Such diVerences suggest that identity priming does not reXect conceptual activation.
Given this assumption about the source of identity priming, interpretation of these
results (Fig. 2a) is quite straightforward. Identity priming from monosyllabic, non-embed-
ded words was facilitatory and robust, whether the words appeared in isolation (Experi-
ment 2A), or in sentences (Experiment 2B). This suggests that the phonological
representations of the lexical tokens of words such as date were activated whether listeners
heard only that word, or a sentence containing the word. As shown in Fig. 2a, however, the
pattern for embedded words (bisyllabic primes such as sedate) is quite diVerent. Responses
to date, for example, tended to be slower after the prime sedate than after an
unrelated prime. For isolated primes (Experiment 2A), this inhibitory eVect was small and
non-signiWcant. But in sentences (Experiment 2B) it was robust, and of similar magnitude
Fig. 2. Identity priming (a) and associative priming (b) from non-embedded and embedded words, in isolation
and in prosodically neutral sentences (Experiments 1 and 2). Priming eVects are mean reaction time diVerences, in
milliseconds (ms), between responses to targets after unrelated primes and responses to targets after related
primes (positive numbers reXect facilitation relative to the unrelated condition; negative numbers reXect inhibi-










































178 D. Norris et al. / Cognitive Psychology 53 (2006) 146–193to the facilitatory eVect for non-embedded words. This pattern of results suggests that
identity priming is being driven here by a representation that is Wrst activated and then
strongly suppressed during the recognition process. As we argued above, there must be
some sense in which a representation of the embedded word is initially activated, or else it
would not be inhibited any more than a completely unrelated word. In both Shortlist (Nor-
ris, 1994) and TRACE (McClelland & Elman, 1986), phonological representations of
embedded words are activated by perceptual input and then inhibited through lexical com-
petition (primarily from the carrier word), as indicated by the simulations in Fig. 1. The
pattern of identity priming for embedded words is exactly what would be expected if the
priming eVect were being driven by the activation of these token representations.
It is worth emphasising that the diVerent eVects of identity priming for embedded and
non-embedded words constitute further support for our assumption that identity priming
reXects overlap between prime and target word at the level of lexical form. The phonologi-
cal overlap between the target word and the prelexical representation of the input is identi-
cal in both cases. Any prelexical phonological priming should therefore have been
equivalent for both embedded and non-embedded words.
The identity priming results thus suggest that although the phonological representations of
both non-embedded and embedded words are activated during speech processing, the temporal
dynamics of their activation proWles diVer. The phonological representations of words that a
speaker intends are activated, and remain so at least until the acoustic oVset of those words.
The phonological representations of words that a speaker does not intend (embedded words)
are also activated, but are rapidly inhibited through lexical competition with the words which
are part of the speaker’s message. We suggested in the introduction that we might need to
manipulate ISI to examine the time-course of activation of phonological representations. The
results of Experiments 2A and 2B make it clear that this manipulation is unnecessary. It
appears that by the oVset of a carrier word such as sedate, date has already lost the competition.
In addition to competition between phonological representations, there may be
another reason why the representations of embedded words do not remain activated for
long. This is that there may be acoustic-phonetic information in the speech signal which
helps listeners to distinguish between the words speakers intend and words which are
spuriously activated. Gow and Gordon (1995), for example, argued that their failure to
observe activation of words such as lips in tulips was because of subtle durational diVer-
ences between word-initial consonants and non-initial consonants (speciWcally, the [l] of
lips tends to be longer than the [l] of tulips). But this failure may have been due to the use
of associative cross-modal priming, which, as we have shown here, does not appear to
provide a reliable measure of lexical activation (see below for further discussion). More
recent studies using other techniques (cross-modal identity priming: Davis et al., 2002;
tracking of eye movements: Salverda, Dahan, & McQueen, 2003), however, have also
suggested that there are subtle acoustic diVerences between word-initial embedded
words and non-embedded words (such as cap in captain and cap in cap tucked), and that
these diVerences modulate lexical activation. Such Wndings suggest that the acoustic
diVerences between word-Wnal embedded words and non-embedded words observed by
Gow and Gordon may indeed aVect lexical activation. There may thus be two inhibitory
forces, bottom-up mismatch and lexical competition, which deactivate words embedded
in other words. Nevertheless, the inhibitory priming observed in Experiments 2A and 2B
suggests that phonological word forms such as date are activated, albeit brieXy, when lis-
teners hear carrier words such as sedate.
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Our Wndings for the monosyllabic (non-embedded) primes indicate that associative priming
does not follow automatically when listeners hear spoken words. As shown in Fig. 2b, primes
such as date do appear to facilitate responses to their associates (e.g., time) when the primes
appear in isolation (Experiment 1A), but not necessarily when they appear in sentence contexts
(Experiment 1B). There was no associative priming from words embedded in carrier words
whether the carrier words appeared in isolation or in sentence contexts. Our data, especially
when taken in conjunction with those of Williams (1988), therefore make at least one thing very
clear: Associative priming cannot be used as a direct and automatic measure of lexical access.
Fig. 3 summarizes the associative priming results for non-embedded words in sentence
contexts. In Wve diVerent experiments in which listeners heard complete sentences we manipu-
lated the speaker, the proportion of related trials, the nature of the secondary task, and the
semantic complexity of the sentences, and found no associative priming. As we pointed out in
the discussion of Experiment 4, acceptance of this null eVect is therefore unlikely to be a type
II error. The only conditions under which we were able to detect associative priming in sen-
tences were when we manipulated the prosody of the sentences (the placement of contrastive
accent; Experiment 4C) and when the sentences were truncated immediately after the prime
(Experiment 3C). These results suggest that cross-modal associative priming does not tap
automatically into any of the lexical representations involved in word recognition.
Another conclusion can be drawn from a comparison of the identity and associative
priming results (see Fig. 2). Although form-based priming (date-date) was found from
monosyllabic, non-embedded words in sentences (Experiment 2B), exactly the same primes
failed to produce associative priming (date-time; Experiment 1B). Likewise, these two
experiments also show that the same bisyllabic words which produced form-based inhibi-
tion (sedate-date) produced no associative priming (sedate-time). If, as we argued above,
facilitatory and inhibitory identity priming reXect activation of phonological lexical
representations, then these dissociations which we have established indicate that associa-
tive priming does not reXect activation of phonological lexical representations.
What then does cross-modal associative priming reXect? We suggest that it measures
conceptual activation associated with the current interpretation of an utterance. Note that
Fig. 3. Associative priming from non-embedded words in sentences. Priming eVects are given for words in pro-
sodically neutral sentences (collapsing over Experiments 1B, 3A, 3B, 4A, and 4B), for words at the end of trun-
cated versions of those sentences (Experiment 3C), and for accented and deaccented words in sentences with
contrastive accent (Experiment 4C). Priming eVects are mean reaction time diVerences, in milliseconds (ms),
between responses to targets after unrelated primes and responses to targets after related primes (positive num-



























180 D. Norris et al. / Cognitive Psychology 53 (2006) 146–193the conceptual representation of an utterance must be dynamically constructed as it can
quite possibly be unique. Furthermore, the same set of words in a diVerent order will have
a quite diVerent meaning. It therefore seems unlikely that priming at this level could be
explained entirely in terms of spreading activation in a network of lexical representations.
According to this view, the contribution of individual words to associative priming will
be determined by the extent to which those words are being incorporated into the interpre-
tation of the sentence. When listeners hear complete sentences, it is reasonable to assume
that they construct interpretations of the meanings of those sentences. But such interpreta-
tions may be relatively shallow under the conditions used in Experiments 1B, 3A, 3B, 4A,
and 4B, that is, where the sentences were not in any discourse context, where a concurrent
lexical decision task had to be performed, and where the secondary task (recognition or
repetition) focused more on the form than on the meaning of the sentences. To use the ter-
minology of Foss and Ross (1983), the eVective context of the targets under these condi-
tions may not have involved much of the speciWc lexical semantics of the prime words.
This account suggests that it should be possible to observe associative priming from
primes in sentence contexts if listeners are encouraged to integrate prime meanings more fully
into the overall interpretation of the sentence. While manipulation of sentential complexity
(Experiment 4B) failed to induce reliable facilitation of target responses, manipulation of sen-
tence prosody (Experiment 4C) did produce priming. Responses to targets were faster after
associated primes than after unrelated primes, both when primes were accented and when
they were deaccented. That is, accent did not simply have a local eVect on the accented word
itself. It appears that varying contrastive accent induced greater depth of processing of the
sentences. For an accented word, this may involve stronger activation of the word’s semantics
not only because the intonation contour draws the listener’s attention to that word but also
because contrastive accent serves the function of setting up a semantic contrast between the
scenario described in the sentence (e.g., the DATE of the election) and some alternative sce-
nario (e.g., the election outcome). The contrastive function of the prosodic contour may also
explain why priming was observed from deaccented words. Here, the semantics of the prime
are still involved in the contrast (e.g., the date of the ELECTION, rather than the date of
some other event).
Sentence prosody and sentential complexity are not the only factors which can modu-
late the importance of a prime in a sentence context. As discussed earlier, the position of
the prime in the sentence and the availability of a discourse context may determine the
extent to which the listener attends to a prime. More radical manipulations have included
truncation of the prime-bearing sentence after the prime and presenting the prime in isola-
tion rather than in a sentence. Thus, when we terminated the sentence materials at the
acoustic oVset of the primes (Experiment 3C), we drew the listener’s attention to the primes
and thus encouraged retrieval of the semantics of those primes. This is likely to involve the
activation of associated words, and thus an associative priming eVect. As in the Williams
(1988) study, we also observed associative priming when prime words were presented in
isolation. Here, in the absence of a larger context, the prime is the eVective context for tar-
get responses. When the utterance consists only of an isolated word, its interpretation is
likely to involve the full semantic representation of that word. This is likely in turn to
involve activation of semantically associated words, and hence associative priming.
This account also explains why cross-modal priming for associates of contextually inap-
propriate meanings of homophones has sometimes been observed. We suggest that one or
more of the above factors encouraged prime processing in the studies showing such eVects
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sentences in Cutler, 1986; clause-Wnal primes in Tabossi, 1988b). When attention is directed
to a prime in one of these ways, priming can arise even for contextually inappropriate
meanings. In Blutner and Sommer (1988), for example, no priming was observed at 0 ms
ISI for either meaning of ambiguous primes when a previously presented question focussed
listeners’ attention away from the primes, but there was priming of responses to associates
of both the appropriate and the inappropriate meanings of the primes when the primes
were in focus. When a given word is brought more fully to the listener’s attention as being
relevant for ongoing utterance interpretation, the lexical semantics of that word can be
activated more strongly, and associative priming may thus be found even for a meaning of
that word that ultimately does not Wt into that interpretation.
Cross-modal associative priming can no longer be taken as providing a direct measure
of the activation of word meaning representations. If it were, words that produce priming
when presented in lists should also produce priming when presented as part of a sentence.
Both our own data and the older data from Williams (1988) show that this is not the case.
As we have already argued, one reason for this is that the task appears to reXect the inter-
pretation of the utterance, rather than of individual words (unless there is only one word in
the utterance, or listeners are encouraged to process the meaning of the primes more
deeply). Another reason is that it is diYcult to interpret the failure to observe priming, as
Marí-BeVa et al. (2000) pointed out. It remains a possibility that even when there is no
priming, the lexical semantic representations that would be needed for spreading associa-
tions are activated, but that these are quickly suppressed because the task is to understand
a sentence rather than to attend to an individual word. On this view, there is always activa-
tion of lexical semantics, but it is suppressed unless it is relevant to the construction of an
utterance interpretation. In any case, it is clear that, given the dissociation between word-
form activation and conceptual activation, a simple account of cross-modal associative
priming based on automatic spread of activation is not tenable. Lexical access does not
automatically lead to robust activation of a word’s semantic associates.
6.3. Modeling speech comprehension
The results of this study suggest that spoken language comprehension involves process-
ing at a number of distinct levels of representation. We have argued, on the basis of the
identity priming data, that processing of phonological word-form information involves the
use of token representations of candidate words, and that the activation of these represen-
tations reXects the strength of support that those words have as perceptual hypotheses at
any moment in time. We have also argued that associative priming reXects the activation of
the developing conceptual representation of the current utterance, and not access to lexical
representations themselves. We thus propose that the representations at both the form and
meaning levels which are used in speech comprehension are not only distinct from each
other, but also from the representations stored in long-term lexical memory of the phono-
logical form and the meaning of words.
Token phonological representations stand as hypotheses about the presence of particular
word forms at speciWc points in a given utterance. They therefore allow the listener to recog-
nize multiple occurrences of the same word in an utterance. Furthermore, token phonological
representations provide an eYcient means for continuous speech recognition. Continuous
speech is a highly ambiguous code: at any one moment in the unfolding of an utterance, the
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and end at many possible locations. An eYcient way to recognize the words that a speaker
actually intended is therefore to consider all of the plausible lexical hypotheses in parallel, and
to have some form of competition between those hypotheses. As Norris (1994) has argued,
however, such an approach becomes implausible if too many words (i.e., potentially the entire
lexicon) have to be considered in parallel. In the Shortlist model, therefore, there is a distinc-
tion between the long-term store of lexical knowledge and the token words that are considered
at any moment in time. Word recognition in Shortlist consists of a search of the lexical store,
followed by the construction of a shortlist of word tokens which contains only the most plau-
sible lexical hypotheses for the current stretch of speech. Phonological tokens thus provide a
framework in which the parsing problem of continuous speech can be solved.
These arguments, and our present results, support models of speech processing which
distinguish between stored phonological knowledge about words and token representa-
tions, such as the Shortlist model. The results challenge models which do not make this dis-
tinction such as PARSYN (Luce, Goldinger, Auer, & Vitevitch, 2000) and the Distributed
Cohort Model (DCM; Gaskell & Marslen-Wilson, 1997). Note that although there is no
explicit distinction between a long-term lexical store and token phonological representa-
tions in TRACE, McClelland and Elman (1986) do suggest that such a distinction would
be necessary in a more fully-speciWed version of the model.
Our data on identity priming present an acute problem for the DCM. In this model,
each word is represented as a vector of activation values over a set of units; some of these
units represent phonological information, others represent semantic information. There is
a single bank of nodes representing the phonology of the input. In Gaskell and Marslen-
Wilson (1997), this is a representation of the onset, nucleus and coda of the current input
syllable. Identity priming is driven by this representation (Gaskell & Marslen-Wilson,
2002), and listeners can also use this representation to perform tasks such as phonetic clas-
siWcation. The phonological representation of a word like trombone should thus have the
representation of bone as a constituent. More speciWcally, the representations of the word
bone and of the second syllable of trombone must be identical. It should thus be impossible
to activate the phonological representation of a word without also activating the represen-
tation of embedded words. In the DCM, therefore, if a carrier word like trombone is acti-
vated, it is not possible to simultaneously inhibit the phonological representation of the
embedded word bone, contrary to what we observed in Experiment 2B.
The solution to this problem is to postulate token representations of candidate words
which (unlike the phonological word-form representations in the DCM and PARSYN) are
distinct from the representations of phonological form that are held in long-term memory.
The token representations of embedded words and their carriers are diVerent, and can
compete with each other when activated by the carrier word in the input. Note that on such
a view, activation of the phonological representations of multiple words is mandatory, that
is, multiple word forms must be considered in parallel. This contrasts with the case of word
meanings. Multiple interpretations of an utterance do not have to be maintained in paral-
lel. Although listeners may need to access the entire contents of a lexical representation to
select the contextually appropriate semantic information, the developing conceptual inter-
pretation of the utterance should only incorporate contextually relevant meaning. For
example, we have suggested that many factors may inXuence how deeply listeners analyze
the words in the sentences they hear. Meaning activation thus appears to be much more
dependent on the current demands of the listening situation than phonological activation.
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made between on-line and stored conceptual representations. We argue that the current inter-
pretation of an utterance contains representations which are distinct from stored lexical-seman-
tic representations. The interpretation of a sentence can therefore be considered to contain
token representations of word meanings. At the most trivial level, listeners can represent the
meaning of a sentence that contains more than one occurrence of the same word. The meaning
of a sentence is thus much more than just the activated meanings of its constituent words.
The dissociation we observed—isolated words produce associative priming but the
same words in sentences do not—is consistent with there being a distinction between
stored semantic representations and a temporary representation of the current utterance’s
interpretation. If associative priming were the consequence of the activation of a word’s
semantic representation in the lexicon, priming would not be expected to change as a func-
tion of whether or not the word appears in a sentence context. In short, the eVective con-
text account of associative priming that we (and Williams, 1988) have oVered makes the
assumption that utterance interpretation is based not on the transient activation of stored
lexical-semantic representations (i.e., of word types), but instead on a separate and tempo-
rary token-based representation of the current utterance.
The second dissociation we observed was between identity and associative priming.
Whereas identity priming reXected activation of token representations of lexical phonolog-
ical form, associative priming appeared to be driven only by sentence-level representations.
A dissociation between identity and associative priming has also been reported by Gaskell
and Marslen-Wilson (2002). They found that associative priming (and, in separate experi-
ments, semantic priming between word pairs, such as synonyms, that were not strongly
associated) was more aVected by competition between words than identity priming. There
was robust identity priming from words with few lexical competitors (i.e., words with early
uniqueness points) and from words with more competitors (words with late uniqueness
points), even when only fragments of the words served as primes. In contrast, however,
there was more meaning-based priming (at least for longer fragments and complete word
primes) for the early unique words than for the late unique words. Gaskell and Marslen-
Wilson (2002) interpreted their data in terms of the DCM. They pointed out that when
there are a number of competitor words consistent with a given fragment of speech, these
competitors all have at least some phonological overlap, but may have no semantic over-
lap. The phonological components of the lexical network in the DCM can thus settle into a
more stable state more rapidly than the semantic components.
It might therefore be possible to provide a similar account within the DCM for the dis-
sociation we observed between identity and associative priming (the semantic component
needing more time to settle than the phonological component). But, as we have already
argued, the DCM appears unable to explain the inhibition we observed from embedded
words in identity priming. Furthermore, because cross-modal associative priming in the
DCM is a function of the activation of the semantic component of the network (i.e., the
stored semantic knowledge about words, rather than token meaning representations), the
model is challenged by the variability we observed in associative priming (between word
and sentence primes, and among diVerent types of sentences).
We therefore propose that the mental lexicon contains separable phonological and
semantic representations for each word, and that this knowledge is used to construct token
representations at both the phonological and the meaning level during speech comprehen-
sion. We have argued that the activation of token phonological representations is an auto-
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contrast, lexical activation does not automatically produce semantic priming. Semantic
priming is a consequence of the activation of representations of utterance meaning. The
construction or activation of utterance meaning is not an automatic consequence of lexical
activation; it appears to depend on the demands of the listening situation, that is, on the
kind of interpretation that the listener is attempting to build. This account can explain the
dissociations and variations in priming, as a function of the type of prime and the type of
target, that were observed in the present series of experiments.
7. Conclusions
In trying to understand the way in which lexical representations are activated during speech
comprehension one must consider multiple levels of processing and representation. In principle,
form-based priming could be driven by at least four diVerent types of phonological representa-
tion: prelexical representations, lexical representations themselves, token-based representations,
or the Wnal post-competition representation of a word. A similar distinction is possible at the
conceptual level. Priming could be driven by initial access to lexical representations, by the pro-
cesses involved in selecting the contextually appropriate meaning from the lexical representa-
tions, or from the semantic information actually incorporated into the interpretation of the
utterance. Since there can be diVerent processes operating at each of these levels, it is necessary
to examine them by attempting to tap selectively into diVerent aspects of processing. We
achieved that in the present study by comparing identity priming with associative priming, by
comparing primes in isolation with primes in sentences, and by varying whether primes were
words intended by speakers or were spuriously part of the speech materials (embedded words).
The data reported here indicate that form-based priming reXects the activation of the
token candidates involved in the lexical competition process postulated by models such as
TRACE and Shortlist. Cross-modal identity priming tracks the activation and inhibition
of these token representations. In contrast, associative priming appears to be driven by the
developing conceptual interpretation of the utterance. Cross-modal associative priming
does not follow automatically from the lexical access process itself. However, the contribu-
tion that individual words make to the utterance interpretation can be modulated. Listen-
ers can be encouraged to incorporate the semantics of particular words into their
interpretations of utterances by manipulations which draw their attention to those words:
presentation in isolation, for example, or truncation of an ongoing sentence, or manipula-
tion of contrastive accents in the sentences’ prosody. These manipulations could give the
impression that priming is being driven by the lexical representation itself. But identity and
associative priming are driven by quite diVerent representations that are not tightly cou-
pled. The phonological form of a word can produce priming even if there is no sign of
priming from the word’s conceptual representation.
Finally, one might ask why priming is produced by these particular representations and
processes (token phonological form, and utterance interpretation) and not by any others (such
as lexical access itself). One tentative answer is that while many other representations must be
accessed, these dynamically constructed representations are the focus of most of the active
computation required for speech comprehension. The competition process is the Wnal and
most important part of form-based processing. Once the competition process is complete the
word has been identiWed and its form need no longer be considered. Similarly, the development
of the utterance interpretation is the Wnal and most important phase in conceptual processing.
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Appendix A. Experimental materials
Note. In Experiments 3B, 3C, and 4C, only the non-embedded primes were presented. In Experiment 2, the tar-
gets, both related (identity) and unrelated, were the non-embedded primes. In item 12, vat is a common expres-









1. date sedate time go
2. come succumb go time
3. stream extreme river chair
4. seat receipt chair river
5. tick frantic cross saucer
6. cup hiccup saucer cross
7. test protest exam grape
8. vine divine grape exam
9. give forgive take day
10. night ignite day take
11. rock baroque hard tax
12. vat cravat tax hard
13. bone trombone dog coVee
14. tea settee coVee dog
15. gun begun shoot trousers
16. crease decrease trousers shoot
17. wrong sarong right far
18. near veneer far right
19. nine benign ten short
20. port report wine rent
21. lease police rent wine
22. rain terrain shine apple
23. pear prepare apple shine
24. soon bassoon later high
25. low hello high later
26. late relate early car
27. van divan car early
28. leaf belief tree receive
29. send descend receive tree
30. lips ellipse kiss poem
31. verse reverse poem kiss
32. long prolong short ten
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1. They planned a date and place to meet with the ambassador. They planned sedate
and placid meals with the ambassador.
2. The rebels were expected to be reasonable and to come and surrender to the govern-
ment forces. The rebels were expected to be reasonable and succumb and surrender to
the government forces.
3. Scientists agreed that the stream temperature changes had reduced the number of Wsh.
Scientists agreed that extreme temperature changes had reduced the number of Wsh.
4. He gave up the seat for me out of some form of courtesy. He gave the receipt to me
out of some form of courtesy.
5. The director made a tick mark at the end of each line. The director made frantic
marks at the end of each line.
6. It was clear that the cup had attracted the attention of the antique dealer. It was clear
the hiccup had attracted the attention of the antique dealer.
7. The inventors agreed to the test about their right to a patent. The inventors agreed to
protest about their right to a patent.
8. They spotted a vine symbol in the mosaic. They spotted divine symbols in the mosaic.
9. We wondered whether we should give them such poor scores. We wondered whether
to forgive them such poor scores.
10. She asked herself what would a night in the jungle be like. She asked herself what
would ignite in the jungle for light.
11. They had not seen that there was a rock sculpture in the Wrst room of the gallery.
They had not seen that there was baroque sculpture in the Wrst room of the gallery.
12. He didn’t like the larger vat because it was more expensive than he could aVord. He
didn’t like the large cravat because it was more expensive than he could aVord.
13. He placed the old bone on the table very carefully. He placed the trombone on the
table very carefully.
14. She remembered that the tea had been rather pleasant. She remembered the settee
had been rather pleasant.
15. The decorator had a gun to apply the glue. The decorator had begun to apply the glue.
16. The eVect of the treatment was to shrink and then crease the fabric quite a lot. The
eVect of the treatment was to shrink and decrease the fabric quite a lot.
17. They were surprised to Wnd that the wrong costumes had been delivered for the
party. They were surprised to Wnd that sarong costumes had been delivered for the
party.
18. It had to be a near match in colour to the original one. It had to be veneer matched in
colour to the original one.
19. The new managing director had made nine recommendations for reorganising the
company. The new managing director made benign recommendations for reorganis-
ing the company.
20. I passed on the port to the person sitting next to me. I passed the report to the person
sitting next to me.
21. Everyone complained about the lease on the premises. Everyone complained about
police on the premises.
22. On the last day of our journey there the rain took us completely by surprise. On the
last day of our journey the terrain took us completely by surprise.
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and looked around for a knife.
24. If it weren’t for enthusiasts then soon music of the 17th century could be forgotten. If
it weren’t for enthusiasts bassoon music of the 17th century could be forgotten.
25. When I hear a low shout from across the street, I know the neighbours are home.
When I hear hello shouted across the street, I know the neighbours are home.
26. The children will be late for the preview of the play. The children will relate their own
version of the play.
27. We noticed the dirtier van outside the charity shop. We noticed the dirty divan out-
side the charity shop.
28. The lecturer tried to explain how a leaf develops in stages. The lecturer tried to
explain how belief develops in stages.
29. They decided they would send a few Xowers to the bereaved. They decided to descend
a few Xoors more to the basement.
30. The colour of all the lips in the painting made it stand out from the others. The
colour of the ellipse in the painting made it stand out from the others.
31. She told of her adventures in verse to an astonished audience. She told her adventures
in reverse to an astonished audience.
32. Some meetings are long and complicate the discussion of issues. Some meetings
prolong and complicate the discussion of issues.
Note. The critical prime words are given in italics. In Experiments 3B and 3C, only the
Wrst sentence of each pair was used.
Appendix C. Sentences used in Experiment 4B
1. The cultural delegation planned a date and place to meet with the ambassador. The
cultural delegation planned sedate and placid meals with the ambassador.
2. The rebel soldiers were expected to be reasonable and to come and surrender to the
government forces. The rebel soldiers were expected to be reasonable and succumb
and surrender to the government forces.
3. The biologists at the conference agreed that the stream temperature changes had
reduced the number of Wsh. The biologists at the conference agreed that extreme tem-
perature changes had reduced the number of Wsh.
4. The businessman immediately gave up the seat for his partner. The businessman
immediately gave the receipt to his partner.
5. The Wnance director made a tick mark at the end of each line in the ledger. The
Wnance director made frantic marks at the end of each line in the ledger.
6. Everyone in the room noticed that the cup had attracted the attention of the antique
dealer. Everyone in the room saw that the hiccup had attracted the attention of the
antique dealer.
7. The angry inventors agreed to a test about their right to a patent. The angry inven-
tors agreed to protest about their right to a patent.
8. The art historian spotted a vine symbol in the newly uncovered mosaic. The art histo-
rian spotted divine symbols in the newly uncovered mosaic.
9. The maths teachers wondered whether they should give their students poor scores.
The maths teachers wondered whether to forgive their students’ poor scores.
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The inexperienced author asked herself what would ignite on the boat to give
light.
11. The visitor had not seen that there was a rock sculpture in the Wrst room of the gal-
lery. The visitor had not seen that there was baroque sculpture in the Wrst room of the
gallery.
12. Unfortunately the larger vat was more expensive than the customer could aVord.
Unfortunately the large cravat was more expensive than the customer could
aVord.
13. To avoid damage, the removals man wrapped the old bone carefully in tissue paper.
To avoid damage, the removals man wrapped the trombone carefully in tissue paper.
14. The nurse was somewhat surprised to get any tea from her aunt. The nurse was some-
what surprised to get the settee from her aunt.
15. The painters saw that the decorator had a gun to apply glue to the wallpaper. The
painters saw that the decorator had begun to apply glue to the wallpaper.
16. Heat treatment will shrink and then crease many fabrics quite a lot. Heat treatment
will shrink and decrease many fabrics quite a lot.
17. The organisers were surprised to Wnd that the wrong costumes had been delivered for
the party. The organisers were surprised to Wnd that sarong costumes had been deliv-
ered for the party.
18. The restorers wanted a near match in colour to the original shade. The restorers
wanted veneer matched in colour to the original shade.
19. The new managing director had made nine recommendations for reorganising the
company. The new managing director made benign recommendations for reorganis-
ing the company.
20. The headmaster passed on the port to the person sitting next to him. The headmaster
passed the report to the person sitting next to him.
21. The bookshop owners complained about the lease on the premises. The bookshop
owners complained about police on the premises.
22. On the last day of their journey there the rain took the disorganized travellers com-
pletely by surprise. On the last day of their journey the terrain took the disorganized
travellers completely by surprise.
23. The TV chef began with a pear and looked around for a knife. The TV chef began to
prepare and looked around for a knife.
24. If it weren’t for enthusiasts then soon music of the 17th century could be
forgotten. If it weren’t for enthusiasts bassoon music of the 17th century could be
forgotten.
25. When the family heard a low shout from across the street, they knew the neighbours
were home. When the family heard hello shouted across the street, they knew the
neighbours were home.
26. The second-year pupils would be late for the preview of the play, their teacher said.
The second-year pupils would relate their own version of the play, their teacher
said.
27. The observant policewoman noticed the dirtier van outside the charity shop. The
observant policewoman noticed the dirty divan outside the charity shop.
28. The patient lecturer tried to explain how a leaf develops in stages. The patient lec-
turer tried to explain how belief develops in stages.
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decided to descend a few Xoors more to the basement.
30. The bright colour of all the lips in the modern painting made it stand out from the
more traditional works. The bright colour of the ellipse in the modern painting made
it stand out from the more traditional works.
31. The explorer told of her adventures in verse to the astonished audience. The explorer
told her adventures in reverse to the astonished audience.
32. Council meetings often are long and complicate the discussion of issues. Council
meetings often prolong and complicate the discussion of issues.
Note. The critical prime words are given in italics.
Appendix D. Sentences used in Experiment 4C
1. He suggested that it was really the DATE of the ELECTION that mattered.
2. We hoped that the star would at least COME to the FILM.
3. On the maps we could Wnd no trace of the STREAM we were LOOKING for.
4. I was surprised that the janitor oVered his SEAT to ME.
5. With great relief the secretary put a TICK against the LAST item on the list.
6. She was allowed no more than a CUP of the SOUP.
7. There were plans to replace the TEST of MANAGEMENT skills with an
interview.
8. The workmen accidentally damaged the VINE in the COURTYARD.
9. The artist decided to GIVE the SCULPTURE to the charity.
10. He was conWdent that he could stand a NIGHT in the DESERT.
11. It made things harder that there was a ROCK in the PATH.
12. They discussed the question of the VAT on the OFFICE equipment.
13. I don’t think you will Wnd a BONE in THAT Wsh.
14. It is impossible to get TEA in THAT cafe.
15. Nobody knew that he had a GUN in EACH hand.
16. It was impossible to detect any CREASE in the SPECIAL fabric.
17. It was established that the statement had been WRONG on TWO points.
18. The tourists wanted to be NEAR to the LOUDSPEAKERS.
19. The best player had won NINE games without LOSS.
20. It was only when they were in PORT that they were REALLY safe.
21. The manager arranged to LEASE BOTH of the buildings.
22. Very luckily there was a great deal of RAIN in JULY.
23. Carefully the assistant positioned another PEAR on the ALREADY full platter.
24. Everyone was wondering how SOON the CRASH would occur.
25. It was important that the sign be LOW enough for CHILDREN to read it.
26. They began to hope that nobody would be LATE for the OPENING.
27. The young couple decided that they would take the VAN ONE more time.
28. For his project the boy described a LEAF from the RARE plant.
29. He explained for the third time that he wanted to SEND a FAX.
30. The odd thing was the colour of the LIPS in the PAINTING.
31. We were required to learn a VERSE of the NEW anthem.
32. The set text was rather LONG for YOUNG readers.
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critical word was accented; in a second version a diVerent word was accented. The two
accented words are marked in capitals.
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